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Character was like a tree and reputation like its shadow. 
The shadow is what we think of it; the tree was the real thing.2 
I. INTRODUCTION 
eputation is an important and complex issue for indi-
viduals, communities and nations.  Like a shadow, repu-
tation reflects the characteristics of an individual with varying 
degrees of precision.   Reputation rarely provides a mirror im-
age, rather, like a shadow, it is something that varies through 
time and the changing position of the world.  As an initial mat-
ter, reputation is defined as “the common or general estimate of 
a person with respect to character or other qualities; the rela-
tive estimation or esteem in which a person or thing is held.”3  
The notion behind reputation is that individuals receive infor-
mation about the behavior of others from third parties; this in-
formation is then used to decide whether or not to behave in a 
similar manner, and how to interact with the other person.4  
Positive reputational information results in increased willing-
ness to act cooperatively with the other person.5  As would be 
expected, the opposite reaction occurs when individuals are 
provided negative reputational information.6 
Reputation is not a phenomenon confined to individuals; 
states have reputations as well.  Yet, the importance of a state’s 
reputation goes beyond the “shadow” cast, for a state’s reputa-
tion has the potential to undermine the “tree” itself.  The poten-
tial harm of reputation derives from the fact that state reputa-
  
 2. Abraham Lincoln, quoted in ANTHONY GROSS, LINCOLN’S OWN STORIES 
109 (1912). 
 3. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 678 (2d ed. 1980).  It is noteworthy 
that reputation is defined as an “estimate.”  This concession within the defini-
tion of reputation—that it is not something that can be identified precisely— 
presents a fundamental problem for reliance on reputation as a compliance 
mechanism of international law: reputation, by its very definition, is impre-
cise.  This imprecision can, and often does, lead to inaccuracies due to over-
estimation of positive or negative attributes. 
 4. Vincent Buskens, Social Networks and the Effect of Reputation on 
Cooperation, Address for the Sixth International Conference on Social Dilem-
mas (March 30, 1998), available at http://www.fss.uu.nl/soc/iscore/papers/ 
paper042.pdf. 
 5. Id.  See also Manfred Milinski et al., Reputation Helps Solve the “Trag-
edy of the Commons,” 415 NATURE 424, 424 (2002). 
 6. See Buskens, supra note 4. 
R 
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tion is an important and vital component in the smooth opera-
tion of international law.  With few traditional legal mecha-
nisms to ensure that states comply with international law, it is 
arguable that reputation is an important, even crucial, mecha-
nism for securing state compliance.7   
Similar to the reputations of individuals, state reputations 
can be highly inaccurate.  State reputations may be flawed or 
bear little resemblance to the actions of the states themselves, 
creating “reputational fallacies.”   In addition to concerns about 
accuracy, issues specific to states exist that are not present 
when examining the reputation of individuals.  These state-
specific issues tend to exacerbate reputational fallacies.  A fun-
damental difference concerns the notion of state sovereignty.  
Sovereignty presupposes that states are “masters of their own 
domain” in all aspects—from governance to culture.8  Policies 
based entirely on self-interest are not only permitted within the 
world of state sovereignty, but are expected.9  Consequently, the 
  
 7. See, e.g., George W. Downs & Michael A. Jones, Reputation, Compli-
ance and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 (2002); Andrew T. Guzman, 
A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1849 
(2002); Claire R. Kelly, Realist Theory and Real Constraints, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
545, 592 (2004); Steven R. Ratner, Overcoming Temptations to Violate Human 
Dignity in Times of Crisis: On the Possibilities for Meaningful Self-Restraint, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 81, 93–94 (2004). Note that while there are many 
articles that discuss reputation within the context of state compliance, few 
other articles, if any, explore actual states’ reputations and the lessons that 
the international community may learn from increased scrutiny of state repu-
tation.   
 8. See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and 
the Invisible Hand of Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 178 (2001).  While 
this postulate of international law has slowly changed in the post-WWII era 
as a result of developments in areas like human rights and modern communi-
cation technologies, sovereignty is still a fundamental basis of the interna-
tional system.  Id. at 179–82. 
 9. Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 
YALE L.J. 1935, 1938 (2002).  Thus, Canadian action pursuing a World Trade 
Organization (WTO) case in order to force Europe to accept shipments of as-
bestos, while considered reprehensible by the Europeans, and a blow to Can-
ada’s reputation, was considered a sound action by the Canadians as it at-
tempted to serve Canada’s interests.  See Report of the WTO Appellate Body, 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar.12, 2001) (Doc# 01-1157), 40 
I.L.M. 1193 (2001), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/ 
wtoab/ec-asbestos(ab).pdf [hereinafter WTO Asbestos Report]. 
File: Picker Macro 122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM 
2004] REPUTATIONAL FALLACIES  71 
nature of state sovereignty makes any examination of state 
reputation more complex than that of individuals.  Another is-
sue is that reputation is inherently subjective and normative.  
State reputations reflect the aggregate of individual subjective 
perceptions of behavior via culturally-anchored criteria that 
differ from state to state with varying societal goals, cultures, 
values, and characteristics.10  This heightened level of subjectiv-
ity presents a problem when attempting to characterize behav-
ior for determinations of whether or not a state is a good inter-
national actor.  Each of these issues increases the complexity of 
information used to inform reputational assessments and, 
therefore, may exacerbate reputation’s inherent imprecision. 
Reputational fallacies raise important issues for international 
law.  In particular, the utility of reputation as a compliance 
mechanism, when reputation does not accurately reflect state 
behavior, may impact the effectiveness of international law.  
This Article will examine the problem of reputational fallacies 
through a comparative examination of two states with very dif-
ferent reputations in the international trade arena: the United 
States and Canada.11  The ensuing examination of U.S. and Ca-
nadian trade actions explores whether each state’s reputation is 
logically connected to its actual behavior in the international 
trade arena.  This Article ultimately concludes that there is lit-
tle substantive support for each state’s reputational difference.12  
While this Article’s examination is confined to the trade actions 
of the United States and Canada, it nonetheless suggests that 
reputation—as a means of enforcing state compliance with in-
ternational obligations—is, at best, an inaccurate tool of inter-
  
 10. See, e.g., Doris Weidemann, Learning About “Face” – “Subjective Theo-
ries” as a Construct in Analysing Intercultural Learning Processes of Germans 
in Taiwan, 2(3) F. QUALITATIVE SOC. RES. par. 4 (2001) (“[c]ulture stan-
dards…are inherently and inextricably relative….”), at http://www.qualitative-
research.net/fqs-texte/3-01/3-01weidemann-e.pdf (last visited Oct. 2, 2004). 
 11. An examination of U.S. and Canadian behavior in the entire realm of 
international law or international relations would be a substantial undertak-
ing and is better left for development within a book. 
 12. This Article assumes Canada’s positive reputation, but see note 40 and 
accompanying text, then compares Canadian trade actions with those of the 
United States—a state routinely vilified for its trade actions.  This Article 
does not seek to muddy the reputation of Canada, nor to improve that of the 
United States, but, rather, it seeks to show that reputation is, at best, a diffi-
cult and intrinsically inaccurate tool of international law. 
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national law.  In fact, this Article suggests that reputation, at 
its worst, is harmful to international law compliance because it 
introduces fallacies and inefficiencies, as well as a whole host of 
other problems associated with its inherent inaccuracy. 
Part II of this Article will briefly examine the concept of repu-
tation and how it interacts with international law and interna-
tional trade.  It will also discuss some of the underlying prob-
lems associated with a comparative examination of reputation.  
Part III of the Article will engage in an in-depth examination of 
the reputations of two states, the United States and Canada, in 
an effort to determine whether their international trade reputa-
tions have any basis in reality.  The Article will then, in Part 
IV, examine the utility of reputation in light of its likely inaccu-
racies, as well as seek to identify the actual sources of those 
reputations.  Finally, the Article will consider the consequences 
of exposing reputational fallacies for the states involved as well 
as for the international legal system. 
II. REPUTATION 
A. Reputation and International Law 
Reputation, as a tool of international law compliance, re-
mains one of the most intriguing concepts in international law.  
Despite Professor Louis Henkin’s modern maxim that “almost 
all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time,”13 in-
ternational law compliance is not clearly understood.  Henkin’s 
maxim, after all, begs the question of why states tend to comply 
with international law.14  The traditional view is that state com-
  
 13. See LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 
(2d ed. 1979); see also Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2599 n.2 (1997) (collecting sources of empirical 
research suggesting that Henkin’s maxim is correct). 
 14. Indeed, while it is common to claim that U.S. behavior within the in-
ternational legal system shows that the United States does not respect or 
comply with international law, the truth is that the United States, through its 
officials, diplomats, soldiers, citizens and so on, obeys international law thou-
sands of times each day — from customs compliance with international stan-
dards to the rules of engagement of soldiers in combat zones.  A few high pro-
file examples of non-compliance should not mar the otherwise stellar U.S. 
record of international law compliance — this despite the fact that world at-
tention will likely focus on the occasional example of U.S. conflict with inter-
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pliance results from a combination of factors—part carrot, part 
stick.15   
The carrots and sticks of state compliance, however, are di-
rectly linked to reputation.  Specifically, several factors increase 
state compliance with international law: fear of retaliation, con-
cern that next time no one will want to “play” with the state, a 
self-serving or altruistic interest in the successful operation and 
legitimacy of the international legal system, and a desire to 
avoid rogue-state status.16  Many of these factors have state 
reputation at their core.17  States’ fears that others will not 
“play” with them in the future is related to the fear that word 
will get out that they are “rule breakers.”  Similarly, concern for 
a state’s image is, of course, a concern about reputation.  The 
interest of states, guided either by self-interest or idealism, in 
the continuing vitality and legitimacy of the international legal 
system is also related to reputation.  Indeed, the existence of a 
consistently disreputable state will naturally lead to questions 
concerning the legitimacy of a legal system that allows such 
flagrant rule-breaking and may cast doubt on the viability of 
international law.   
In addition to the traditional carrots and sticks, other fea-
tures of international law can be directly linked to reputation.  
New mechanisms to assist in the enforcement of international 
law, such as the employment of binding adjudication and re-
lated authorized retaliations, are directly related to reputa-
tion.18  An offending state’s reputation likely influences other 
  
national law and draw the inaccurate conclusion that the United States is 
regularly non-compliant. 
 15. There is much debate as to why international law is followed, with 
many reasons advanced.  Examination of those reasons suggests that they 
can, for the most part, be considered either as “carrots” (such as sharing in the 
benefits of an effective international legal system) or as sticks (such as the 
employment of sanctions by other parties against rule-breakers).  See JOHN H. 
JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT 173 (4th ed. 2002) (lists several of the reasons 
advanced for international law compliance).   
 16. See generally Hongju Koh, supra note 13 (providing a broad overview 
and critique of the historical and modern theories of state compliance with 
international law).  
 17. See Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 99–100.  
 18. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement 
of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
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states or international organizations when they decide to take 
the extreme step of instituting procedures that lead to retalia-
tion.  Resorting to international proceedings, an unusual step in 
the generally diplomatic world of international law, may be 
thought necessary to force a disreputable state with a reputa-
tion for showing disregard for its obligations under interna-
tional legal system into compliance.19  Hence, both traditional 
factors and modern enforcement mechanisms that ensure state 
compliance with international law are related, in some respects, 
to reputation.  
Just as reputation is a vital component of international law 
enforcement, inaccurate reputation may cause significant harm 
to the efficient operation of the international legal system.  For 
example, state reputation can impact international adjudication 
and negotiations.20  With respect to international adjudication, 
inaccurate reputation may cloud the integrity of claims and of 
evidence and testimony.  It may undermine a state’s ability to 
rely on good faith and equitable defenses.21  Inaccuracy may also 
reduce the incidence of support from other states, and could 
encourage other states to join the opposition either directly or 
  
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 
354, 33 I.L.M. 1226 [hereinafter WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding]. 
 19. Thus, when creating the WTO, the world trade system purposely 
moved away from the traditional diplomatic dispute resolution employed in 
the GATT in order to enforce compliance where the previous diplomatic sys-
tem had frequently failed.  See, e.g., Claude E. Barfield, Free Trade, Sover-
eignty, Democracy: The Future of the World Trade Organization, 2 CHI. J. INT’L 
L. 403, 407 (2001).   There may also be a feeling that it is time to teach such a 
disreputable state a “lesson” so as to encourage future compliance of its other 
international legal obligations.  See John E. Noyes, The Functions of Compro-
missory Clauses in U.S. Treaties, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 831, 835–38 (1994). 
 20. See infra Part III.A.–B. 
 21. Cf. Reena Sengupta, A Contest of Reputations: Media Strategy: Public 
Relations Can Be as Important as a Sound Legal Case, FIN. TIMES (London), 
Feb. 16, 2004, at 11 (negative impressions created by a lawsuit against corpo-
rate entities have significant impact upon corporate reputation and share-
holder value; according to University of Chicago study, winning the case will 
do little to reverse the damage to reputation); Peter Nicolas, American–Style 
Justice in No Man’s Land, 36 GA. L. REV. 896, 955 (2002) (“If tribes earn a 
reputation for dishonoring contracts and then invoking the defense of sover-
eign immunity when sued in contract, it will impact their business reputation, 
and those contracting with them will either demand a contractual waiver of 
sovereign immunity or a higher contract price.”). 
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through some form of amicus curiae briefs.22  This issue is ac-
centuated when two opposing states represent different ends of 
the reputational continuum.23  Detrimental reputational inaccu-
racies may be reflected in international negotiation as an inabil-
ity of a state to have its negotiation positions accepted or sup-
ported.24  A state’s offers of concessions are mistrusted and/or 
discounted and may be rejected absent some form of guaranty 
or binding adjudication.25  Put simply, states operating under a 
  
 22. This claim is hard to prove, for rarely do states claim such activities as 
a consequence of reputation.  However, the recent World Court Advisory case 
concerning Israel provides some support for this assertion.  Forty-seven non-
party states made submissions in the case; it is reasonable to assume that 
Israel’s reputation was part of the motivation for the overwhelming interna-
tional response.  See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, July 9, 2004, 43 
I.L.M. 1009 (2004), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imw 
p/imwp_advisory_opinion/.  Additionally, and perhaps a bit cynically, it would 
not be surprising if reputation affects arbitrators or judges, hence impacting 
their decisions to some extent—they are, after all, human.  While this Article 
makes no pronouncement on the merit of the claim, World Court Judge 
Schwebel’s vigorous dissent in Nicaragua v. United States could be inter-
preted to suggest that perhaps such phenomena was present in the minds of 
the judges in the majority opinion.  See Military and Paramilitary Activities 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 266 (June 27).  Thus, a state with a negative 
reputation will be operating under a handicap and will have a tougher time 
prevailing during adjudication.  In contrast, a state with a good reputation 
will more likely have each of the factors above working to their benefit: having 
their testimony and evidence accorded greater weight, enjoying the support of 
other states in their adjudications, and receiving the benefit of the doubt from 
judges and arbitrators. 
 23. As an example, were North Korea (generally considered to be a rogue 
state) to be involved in a dispute with Finland (generally considered to be a 
law-abiding state) it would be surprising if their respective reputations did 
not play a role in the process.  Intuitively, I believe this occurs in Canadian–
U.S. trade adjudication, at least to some extent; however, proving such an 
assertion would be very difficult. 
 24. This is also hard to show as states will rarely characterize rejection of a 
position due to reputation, but it is likely that the position of the United 
States in international negotiations suffers as a consequence of its reputation. 
 25. Cf. Nicolas, supra note 21, at 955 (describing how reputation for claim-
ing immunity from contractual obligations via a sovereign immunity defense 
may result in other parties being unwilling to contract with Native Ameri-
cans). 
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reputational cloud will simply have a harder time achieving 
their negotiation goals.26   
Accordingly, there are significant costs to reputation.  Where 
state reputation is not accurate, as with the international trade 
reputations of the United States and Canada, reputational costs 
are borne without legitimate reason.27  Invalid reputational 
costs, at best, are an inefficient tool of international relations, 
and, at worst, a powerfully destructive element in the develop-
ment and maintenance of the international legal system.  How-
ever, despite this danger, it must be re-emphasized that reputa-
tion is integral to the operation of international law.  Thus, dis-
avowing reputation as a compliance mechanism would likely 
have dramatic consequences for the continuing viability of in-
ternational law.  Therefore, this Article posits that reputation 
be examined within the context of international law and state 
behavior and resultant problems be resolved so that reputation 
may continue to be employed in international law.  Reputation 
should be exposed for what it often is—an inaccurate and harm-
ful tool of international law—and corrected through examina-
tion and exposure.  Accordingly, this Article’s attempt to make 
the issue of reputation more transparent should contribute to a 
greater understanding and more accurate use of reputation in 
international law, thereby contributing to the continuing viabil-
ity and development of the international system.   
B. Comparative Reputational Analysis  
A brief discussion of the pitfalls of comparative analysis in 
the international reputation context is merited before beginning 
the process of comparing the United States and Canada.  Com-
parative analysis is always fraught with difficulties.28  The vari-
ables and differences among states can simply be too qualita-
tively and quantitatively difficult to allow for accurate compari-
son.  Most notably, failure to take both legal and societal cul-
  
 26. The special trade rules applied to China as a condition of its member-
ship in the WTO may be described as of this variety, particularly the dumping 
and subsidies rules.  See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China’s 
WTO Accession Saga, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1469, 1514 (2000). 
 27. See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 28. See John H. Langbein, Judging Foreign Judges Badly: Nose-Counting 
Isn’t Enough, 18 JUDGES J. 4, 50 (1979). 
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ture into account can result in a discontinuity between the as-
serted comparisons and the realities of the states and areas of 
study.29  With respect to reputation, where legal and societal 
cultures play such prominent roles, a comparative analysis may 
be especially vulnerable.30     
As an initial point, certain differences between the two coun-
tries are apparent.31  Indeed, the Canadian economy is radically 
  
 29. Id.  
 30. When there is an effort to draw broad international law lessons from 
an examination of a specific subset of international law, one would be remiss 
not to take into account the problems inherent in a comparative analysis 
across legal disciplines. Accordingly, it should be pointed out that this is a 
comparative analysis within the world of international trade.  While interna-
tional trade is a vital and highly dynamic part of the international legal sys-
tem, it is also significantly different from many of the other fields within in-
ternational law.  This dynamism can clearly be seen in the vast scope and 
number of international economic law agreements negotiated in recent dec-
ades, including hundreds of regional trade agreements, bilateral investment 
treaties, and multilateral agreements such as the WTO.  Indeed, WTO mem-
bership is starting to rival that of the United Nations—the WTO has gained 
147 members and 31 observer/applicant members since it was created almost 
10 years ago, compared with the 191 members of the UN.  See WTO website at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; UN website at 
http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html.  Furthermore, resort to the 
WTO’s dispute settlement body has produced a significant volume of deci-
sions, easily rivaling that of the International Court of Justice.  Over 300 
cases have been filed with the WTO since 1995; comparatively, just over 100 
contentious cases and 25 advisory opinions have come before the World Court 
since 1947.  See WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dis 
pu_e/dispu_status_e.htm; World Court website at http://www.icj-cij.org/ 
icjwww/idecisions.htm.  Additionally, international economic law has strong 
institutions, including unusually strong (for international law) mechanisms to 
encourage state compliance.  See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understand-
ing, supra note 18, arts. 16, 17.14.  Flowing through international trade—and 
in constant tension with the public international law component of interna-
tional trade—is economic theory and its emphasis on market forces.  Poten-
tially, the role of economics in the field of international trade law could result 
in the reduction of the role of traditional norms of international law for inter-
national trade law, and their continuing replacement with economic values 
applied to state-to-state interactions.  This difference between international 
trade/economic law and traditional public international law should be kept in 
mind throughout the Article.   
 31. This is a case of comparing apples and oranges.  But like apples and 
oranges, while certain external appearances may suggest radical differences 
between them, they are in fact essentially the same thing — two pieces of 
fruit.  See Scott A. Sanford, Apples and Oranges: A Comparison, in THE BEST 
OF ANNALS OF IMPROBABLE RESEARCH 93 (Marc Abrahams ed., 1998) (finding 
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different from that of the United States.  For example, Canada 
imports and exports the vast bulk of its trade with just one 
country—the United States.32  Additionally, Canada has a con-
tinuous history of being heavily resource-dependent in its 
trade.33  In contrast, U.S. trade is more widely diversified.34  In 
addition, each state’s constitutional framework includes signifi-
cant differences which impact their trade regimes and actions.35   
Thus, this Article will not seek to show that these two states 
are identical.  Rather, this Article simply illustrates that there 
are important similarities between the United States and Can-
ada, without endeavoring to ascertain the reasons for those 
similarities or to engage in a highly detailed comparative ex-
amination of subtle underlying differences.  A broad and gen-
eral finding of comparability between the two states is sufficient 
for the purpose of this Article’s thesis.36  Having laid out the pit-
falls and problems inherent in a comparative analysis, there is 
still a tremendous benefit to such examinations  derived from 
lessons and problems highlighted in context rather than in iso-
lation.  Therefore, while the conclusions that flow from com-
parative analysis may be susceptible to attack, the benefits will 
frequently outweigh otherwise valid concerns.   
III. AN EXAMPLE OF DISPARATE REPUTATIONS:  CANADA, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
This section of the Article will compare the trade actions of 
Canada and the United States against the backdrop of their 
reputations in international trade.37  To begin, Canada is ad-
  
that in fact when scientifically compared, “apples and oranges are very simi-
lar.”), available at http://www.improbable.com/airchives/paperair/volume 
1/v1i3/air-1-3-apples.html  
 32. THE ECONOMIST, POCKET WORLD IN FIGURES 121 (2003). 
 33. Id. at 120–21.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 34. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 223.  See infra Part III.B.1. 
 35. See infra Part III.A. 
 36. But such a finding must nonetheless be grounded on an understanding 
of the problems inherent in comparative analysis, or the findings will them-
selves be less persuasive. 
 37. Before starting what may be viewed as an attack on Canada, which it 
certainly is not, I feel compelled to note that I admire and respect Canada.  I 
have enjoyed frequent visits to Canada and have traveled all over the country, 
from Nova Scotia to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory.  I believe Canada, 
like the United States, to be a wonderful country. 
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mired the world over.38  Indeed, Canada’s reputation among 
other states is as positive as the United States’ is negative.39  
This is as true in international law as in all other areas of their 
foreign policies.  The question, then, is whether this reputa-
tional disparity accurately reflects the behavior and policies of 
the two neighbors.  Comparative examination of such a complex 
question for all aspects of international law would be too com-
plex and lengthy for this Article; hence, this Article will narrow 
its focus to the reputational disparity between the United 
States and Canada within international trade.40  Accordingly, as 
the initial step in showing that reputation is a problematic de-
vice for controlling states, this Article will show the absence of a 
legitimate basis for the difference in these two states’ interna-
tional trade reputations. 
This Article does not endeavor to show that the United States 
is a good actor or that Canada is a bad actor.  Rather, the aim of 
this analysis is to show that Canada has engaged in behavior 
markedly similar to that of the United States—employing a 
healthy mixture of altruistic measures contrasted with some 
negative actions best explained as part of the routine behavior 
of states in protecting their self-interest.41  Thus, Canada’s and 
the United States’s disparate reputations will be shown as hav-
ing little foundation in reality.   
The following analysis will identify several aspects of U.S. 
trade policy that are heavily criticized, and then identify similar 
  
 38. See, e.g., Michael Doyon, Letter, Stop Playing Games with Iran, 
TORONTO STAR, Aug. 2, 2004, at A19; Bill Redekop, International Trade Group 
Optimistic on Prairie Berry, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, July 21, 2004, at A5; 
Robert Colapinto, The Clean-Up Act, CA MAG., May 1, 2004, at 20; compare 
with Press Release, Bob Menendez Calls on State Department, Federal 
Document Clearing House (Aug. 20, 2004), available at 2004 WL 62027829; 
Robert Robb, Kerry Can Imagine But He’s Just a Dreamer, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, 
Aug. 1, 2004, at V1. 
 39. See infra Part III. 
 40. As noted before, reputation is hard to measure and prove empirically.  
My “gut reaction” is that Canada’s reputation is better.  However, the impres-
sion of one academic does not prove much.  Accordingly, I interviewed interna-
tional trade practitioners from the various states’ trade bars, academia, and 
from the trade offices of Canada and the United States.  Their impressions 
substantially accorded with mine.  
 41. See, e.g., WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9 (complaint by Canada, 
with Brazil and the United States as Third Party Participants, attempting to 
force the sale of asbestos onto the European market). 
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or comparable Canadian actions.  For U.S. trade policy, the 
primary issues examined are: 
a.  International Trade Negotiations42 
b.  Trade Dispute Adjudication43  
c.  Protectionism 44 
d.  Trade Distorting Regional Agreements45  
e.  Contentious Trade Issues46  
f.  Sanctions and Embargoes47 
Although there are other concerns integral to the examination 
of U.S. trade policy, these six are generally considered of pri-
mary importance.   
After reviewing U.S. trade policy, the analysis focuses upon 
Canadian trade policy in an effort to discern whether Canada 
has engaged in similar or comparable behavior without incur-
ring a reputational impact equivalent to that of the United 
States.  Indeed, an examination of the trade policy issues in the 
previous paragraph will show that while Canada’s actions may 
not be as “egregious” as the United States in some areas,48 Can-
ada is just as culpable in several others.49  Beyond some level of 
culpability, Canada also exemplifies behaviors that are directly 
comparable to U.S. policy, yet all without the large reputational 
cost borne by the United States.50  The following section ex-
plores each trade policy issue in detail and identifies behaviors 
  
 42. For example, the United States is considered a difficult state with 
which to negotiate trade agreements.  See infra Part III.A. 
 43. Including what issues the United States considers worth fighting over, 
how often the U.S. is labeled a “rule-breaker,” and the aggressiveness of the 
U.S. in pursuing trade adjudication with other states.  See infra Part III.B. 
 44. For example, the United States is thought to employ excessive domes-
tic protectionism—ranging from agricultural subsidies and application of 
dumping and countervailing duty laws to the aggressive use of unilateral 
trade sanctions.  See infra Part III.C. 
 45. See infra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 46. In particular, the use of international trade law to advance U.S. self-
interests in such fields as genetically modified food, hormone additives, and 
widespread use of antibiotics in its livestock.  See infra Part III.D. 
 47. The United States has used international trade law to further such 
“non-trade” issues as national security, labor rights, the environment, and 
human rights.   See infra Part III.D. 
 48. See infra Part III.C.–D. 
 49. See infra Part III.C.–D. 
 50. See infra Part III.D. 
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and actions by Canada that are often comparable to the United 
States. 
A. International Trade Negotiation 
International trade agreements tend to follow a pattern.  
Stage one is trade negotiations.  Negotiations are then followed 
by formal agreements with which states are expected to comply, 
with non-compliance resulting in interstate disputes which may 
be concluded through various dispute resolution mechanisms.51  
Thus, it is only fitting that the comparison between the United 
States and Canada begin where trade law begins, with an ex-
amination of the states’ negotiating characteristics.   
The U.S. constitutional structure makes it difficult for the 
United States to negotiate trade agreements.  The constitu-
tional requirement of separation of powers gives Congress cer-
tain powers over international trade, while giving other powers 
to the Executive branch.52  The problems inherent in dividing 
power over international trade are exacerbated by the constant 
congressional and presidential election cycles.53  Furthermore, 
Congressional participation in the development of trade agree-
ments has historically been fraught with difficulty.  The last 
time Congress engaged in detailed trade legislation, resulting in 
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, the log-rolling and pork 
barrel politics encompassed within the legislation had devastat-
  
 51. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18; Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, art. 118, 1883 U.N.T.S. 3, 65–66;  
see generally UN Office of Legal Affairs, Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of 
the Sea, Oceans and Law of the Sea (providing a brief synopsis of bodies es-
tablished by the convention and alternatives for settlement of disputes), at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2004).  
 52. Congress has the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,” 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and to “pass bills for raising revenue,” U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 7, cl. 1, while that of the President is to “make treaties,” U.S. CONST. 
art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and generally take charge of foreign affairs.  See generally 
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (stating that 
decisions regarding international affairs are vested in the President). 
 53. See, e.g., John H. Knox, NAFTA’s Environmental Provisions: What 
Problems Were They Intended to Address?, 23 CAN.–U.S. L.J. 403 (1997); C. 
O’Neal–Taylor, Fast Track, Trade Policy, and Free Trade Agreements: Why the 
NAFTA Turned Into a Battle, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 1, 10 n.35 
(1994). 
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ing effects upon the world trading system during the 1930s.54  
Compounding the problem, Congressional action sometimes 
suggests mistrust of the Executive branch, including Congress’s 
refusal to fully support executive deals negotiated without its 
approval.55  This lack of trust necessitated Fast Track and the 
later Trade Promotion Authority,56 itself a political “hot po-
tato.”57  Understandably, states are loath to negotiate with the 
United States under these circumstances.   Despite these prob-
lems, states do nonetheless negotiate with the United States.  
Indeed, given the role of the U.S. economy in the world, it would 
be nearly impossible for states to avoid dealing with the United 
States.58  Hence, despite the impediments, the United States 
has been a major player in the development of the world trading 
system. 
Just as the United States has been integral to the develop-
ment of the international trade regime, Canada has also played 
  
 54. Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (enumerat-
ing a very lengthy list of materials and goods subject to tariffs); Brady P. 
Priest, Steel Tariffs: A Shining Example of the Tension Between Politics and 
Economics in the United States Today,  28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1025, 1035 
(2003).  
 55. As exemplified in the confrontation over the results of the Kennedy 
Round (Final Act Embodying the Results of the 1964-67 Trade Conference, 
B.I.S.D. (15th Supp.) at 4 (1968) (consisting of multilateral negotiations 
against dumping practices)).  See Renegotiations Amendment Act of 1968, 
Pub. L. No. 90-634, § 201, 82 Stat. 1345, 1347 (1968) (declaring that the Anti-
dumping Act of 1921 still retains primacy over agreements entered into by the 
President during the Kennedy Round); S. REP. NO. 89-1341, at 3 (2d Sess. 
1966) (expressing the Finance Committee’s concern that the Executive Branch 
has not been vested with authority to engage in international trade agree-
ments within the Kennedy Round of negotiations, especially as the unfair 
trade practices involved have effects in the domestic economy, an area within 
legislative control). 
 56. See Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002, 19 U.S.C. §3801 
(2002); Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978 (1975) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). 
 57. See generally Laura L. Wright, Note, Trade Promotion Authority: Fast 
Track for the Twenty-First Century?, 12 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 979 (2004) 
(describing the history of Fast Track and the continuing legislative restric-
tions of the Executive’s ability to unilaterally make trade agreements). 
 58. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 24, 32 (the United States has  
the largest GDP in the world and ranks first for total world exports (account-
ing for just over 15% of all global exports)). 
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a significant role in international trade negotiations.59  The for-
mation of the ground-breaking Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agree-
ment60 (CUSFTA) was crucial in the development of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).61  Thus, it was no surprise that 
Canada played a key role during the Uruguay Round negotia-
tions that resulted in the international community adopting a 
new trade system to replace the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT).62  While receiving help, it was Canadian 
trade negotiators who developed the contours of the system that 
was to become the WTO, including being the first to coin the 
name.63  In other words, even though anti-globalization protest-
ers often describe the WTO as a U.S.-created monster, fair at-
tribution, for whatever one believes about the WTO, should also 
go to Canada.   
Regardless of these negotiation successes, Canada, like the 
United States, can be a difficult negotiating party.64  Just as 
with the United States, Canada’s constitutional structure 
makes international trade negotiations difficult.  Canada’s Con-
stitution provides the provinces with a joint role in certain for-
eign relations issues, including trade.65  Specifically, Canadian 
  
 59. George Anderson, Canadian Federalism and Foreign Policy, 27 CAN-
U.S. L.J. 45, 46 (2001); see also JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 
45 (2d ed. 1997). 
 60. MICHAEL HART, A TRADING NATION 372–93 (2002). 
 61. See, e.g., id. at 411.  The negotiation and development of the CUSFTA, 
with its broad coverage and binding dispute settlement mechanisms, showed 
that international trade agreements could provide greater coverage than that 
provided by the GATT.  Id. 
 62. Canada, along with the European Union, was instrumental in the pro-
posal and acceptance of the idea of using the Uruguay Round to establish a 
new trade system to replace GATT.  Id.  See also Final Act Embodying the 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 
1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994), 33 I.L.M. 
1125 (1994). 
 63. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 45. 
 64. See HART, supra note 60, at 193, 447 (presenting the view that Cana-
dian negotiators were “chiselers” who would “seek[ ] much and giv[e] little” in 
GATT negotiations).  
 65. Carl Grenier, States, Provinces, and Cross-Border International Trade, 
26 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 175 (2000).  This is a consequence of the fact that the Cana-
dian constitutional grant of trade authority to the Canadian federal govern-
ment was originally interpreted narrowly by the Privy Council in London, and 
later by the Canadian Supreme Court.  See Att’y Gen. of Can. v. Att’y Gen. of 
Ontario (Labour Conventions Case), [1937] 1 D.L.R. 673, 682; see also Patrick 
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provinces have significant authority over internal trade issues.  
Consequently, where international trade rules have an impact 
domestically, the federal government must work with the pro-
vincial government to assure provincial assent via provincial 
legislation.66  This was an issue in the implementation of the 
CUSFTA67 and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA),68 and could be problematic in the future if public or 
provincial attitudes move away from supporting free trade.69  
Thus, constitutional federalism issues play a major role in Can-
ada’s participation in the world trade environment.70 
Constitutional divisions are not the only problem facing nego-
tiators on both sides of the border; ratification and implementa-
tion of trade agreements are also problematic.  Difficulties rati-
fying and implementing international trade agreements are 
well known.  U.S. Congressional battles over NAFTA and the 
WTO and Trade Promotion Authority (previously known as 
Fast Track)71 received considerable world attention.72  Yet, Can-
ada has had problems delivering ratification and implementa-
tion of international trade agreements as well.  For example, 
the Mulroney government’s73 successful and arduous negotiation 
  
Monahan, Canadian Federalism and its Impact on Cross-Border Trade, 27 
CAN.-U.S. L.J. 19 (2001). 
 66. Att’y Gen. of Can., [1937] 1 D.L.R. at 683. 
 67. HART, supra note 60, at 388–90. 
 68. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 
107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993), available at http://www.world 
tradelaw.net/dsc/searchmain/searchreports.htm [hereinafter NAFTA].  
 69. Anderson, supra note 59, at 49–50. 
 70. A related problem arises when the federal government uses interna-
tional trade regulation for actions that would not be allowed under domestic 
regulation in that such actions may be perceived as discrimination against 
foreign parties.  The result is inadvertent protectionism, but in truth the gov-
ernment’s actions are a consequence of the Canadian constitutional division of 
powers between the federal and provincial governments.  For an example of 
inadvertent protectionism, see Ethyl Corp. v. Can. (Award on Jurisdiction), 38 
I.L.M. 708 (NAFTA Art. 11 Arbitral Tribunal 1999). 
 71. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act § 2101. 
 72. See generally O’Neal–Taylor, supra note 53, at 18 n. 67 (Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-794, 76 Stat. 872 (repealed 1975)).  See also 
Samuel C. Straight, GATT and NAFTA:  Marrying Effective Dispute Settle-
ment and the Sovereignty of the Fifty States, 45 DUKE L.J. 216, 220 (1995). 
 73. Brian Mulroney served as Canada’s prime minister between September 
17, 1984 and June 13, 1993.  For a description of Mulroney’s government’s 
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of the CUSFTA was followed by a very tempestuous and uncer-
tain implementation battle.74  The contentious implementation 
threatened to change the balance of power in the Canadian Par-
liament as well as endanger the Prime Minister’s position.75  
Therefore, despite international focus upon U.S. ratification and 
implementation battles, both states have struggled with the 
issue.  
Finally, the United States has been increasingly criticized for 
moving away from the multilateral trade development policy 
exemplified by the WTO and focusing too much energy on bilat-
eral or regional trade agreements.76  The time, energy and re-
sources expended by the United States on bilateral free trade 
agreements also detract from the ability and focus of the United 
States in multilateral negotiations, to the detriment of the 
WTO’s present round of negotiations.77  Additionally, while 
these agreements are beneficial to the parties involved, they 
have received tremendous criticism as trade-distorting meas-
  
policies after he took office, especially in relation to the United States, see 
HART, supra note 60, at 372–75. 
 74. Id. at 389.  
 75. Following the signing of the Agreement and introduction and imple-
mentation of legislation in 1988, the Mulroney government was forced by the 
Liberal opposition in the Canadian Senate to call an election, the main issue 
being the implementation of the trade agreement.  Id.  Nor was it assured 
that Mulroney would emerge victorious, and, indeed, the popular vote was 
split on the issue.  Id.  However, with its “first past the post” election system, 
the Conservatives actually won the majority needed to force the bill through 
and the trade agreement with the United States received the Canadian im-
plementing legislation it needed.  Id. 
 76. See Colin B. Picker, A Time to Fight Back:  Ending the Abuse of Article 
XXIV (paper accepted for delivery at International Conference: The WTO at a 
Crossroads (13-14 December 2004, Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University, Is-
rael)), available at http://www.biu.ac.il/LAW/wto_conference_draft.htm (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2004).  The United States currently has bilateral or regional 
trade agreements with Israel, Jordan, Canada, Mexico, Singapore, and Chile.  
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REGIONAL TRADE 
AGREEMENTS, at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Regional/Section_ 
Index.html.  In addition, there are ongoing negotiations with the rest of the 
Americas as part of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), as well as 
with Australia, Morocco, Panama, Central America and the Southern African 
Customs Union.  Id. 
 77. See Picker, supra note 76 (citing comparative ease of negotiating re-
gional trade agreements as a factor in states’ preference over more time-
consuming multilateral agreements). 
File: Picker Macro 122704.doc Created on:  12/27/2004 1:25 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM 
86 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 30:1 
ures.  For example, it is more likely that a product will trade 
between two states when there is a free trade agreement, even 
if the most efficient supplier would be another state outside of 
the agreement.78   
Canada has similarly placed substantial focus upon develop-
ment of numerous bilateral and regional trade agreements.79  
Specifically, Canada is involved with NAFTA and bilateral 
agreements with Israel, Chile and Costa Rica.80  In addition, 
like the United States, there are also ongoing Canadian nego-
tiations with Singapore, the European Free Trade Association, 
the Central America Four, and as part of the FTAA.81   
Furthermore, the proliferation of regional trade agreements 
can result in a different sort of harm to the international trade 
system — an institutional harm.82  Institutional harm occurs 
when countries resort to bilateral or regional agreements rather 
than multilateral agreements, resulting in the expenditure of 
significantly more of a country’s limited negotiating resources 
on regional agreements than on the ongoing WTO negotiations.  
Specifically, without strong commitment to the multilateral 
trade system—such as that provided in the early nineties by 
Canada in the development of the WTO—the WTO’s develop-
ment will likely stagnate as countries achieve their trade goals 
through regional trade agreements.83  Canada’s expenditure of 
its limited resources and time on bilateral and regional negotia-
tions has an increased potential to hamper continuing develop-
  
 78. See Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and Mul-
tilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 
419, 432 (2001) (discussing the effects on trade regionalism when an economi-
cally superior country enters into a bilateral agreement with an economically 
inferior one). 
 79. See WTO Secretariat, World Trade Organization, WTO Trade Policy 
Review of Canada, WT/TPR/S/112/Rev.1 (March 19, 2003), at 21–25, available 
at http://docsonline.wto.org [hereinafter WTO Trade Policy Review]. 
 80. See NAFTA, supra note 68, pmbl. (regarding Canadian involvement); 
See Alberta Government, Free Trade and the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) (regarding Canadian bilateral agreements), available at http:// 
www1.agric.gov.ab.ca/$department/deptdocs.nsf/all/psc5097?opendocument 
(last visited Oct. 6, 2004). 
 81. International Trade Canada, Regional and Bilateral Initiatives, at 
http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/reg-en.asp (last visited Oct. 15, 2004). 
 82. Picker, supra note 76.  This novel concept is developed in a presenta-
tion by the author with likely publication.   
 83. JACKSON, supra note 59, at 45. 
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ment of the WTO because these negotiations divert a large por-
tion of the country’s limited negotiation resources away from 
the multilateral trade system.  In comparison, the United 
States’ much larger office of the United States Trade Represen-
tative (USTR) affords the United States the ability to engage in 
regional trade agreement negotiations to a significantly greater 
extent than smaller or less populated states like Canada.84   
As shown, the relative harm of regional trade agreement ne-
gotiations on the world’s multilateral trading system, the WTO, 
is therefore likely to be greater when a state like Canada ex-
pends its limited negotiating resources on them.  In the end, 
while the United States is castigated as a problematic negotiat-
ing partner, examination of Canada’s negotiating characteris-
tics shows it also has problems negotiating and delivering do-
mestic assent to international trade agreements and with 
squandering scarce negotiating resources.  
B. International Trade Adjudication 
A state’s reputation is often shaped by its participation in in-
ternational adjudication, either through the defense of state 
actions and legislation or through the aggressiveness with 
which a state seeks to have its international rights protected.  
Despite the fact that state-to-state dispute resolution is still the 
exception in foreign affairs, sometimes states choose to bring a 
case against another state.85  Diplomatic resolutions are the pre-
ferred state-to-state dispute resolution mechanism.86  Regard-
less, the modern international trade regimes of the WTO and 
NAFTA, in contrast to the prior GATT regime, provide for bind-
ing state-to-state adjudication.87  Most revolutionary of all, ad-
judication under modern trade regimes permits sanctions to 
  
 84. The actual discretionary appropriation of the Office of the U.S. Trade 
Representative in 2002 was $30 million; the estimated appropriation for 2004 
was $37 million.  U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT: FED. FUNDS, available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/ 
fy04/sheets/fpaa_21.xls (last visited Aug. 26, 2004). 
 85. Jose E. Alvarez, The New Dispute Settlers: (Half) Truths and Conse-
quences, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. 405, 411 (2003). 
 86. See id. 
 87. WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18; NAFTA, su-
pra note 68, ch. 20. 
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bring states into compliance.88 Hence, these disputes provide a 
prime opportunity for formation of state reputations.  The repu-
tations resulting from trade adjudication can reflect (i) a state’s 
aggressiveness, (ii) how often its behavior either violates or ap-
pears to violate trade rules and, (iii) those actions a state is 
willing to go to “court” to defend.  Accordingly, a comparison of 
U.S. and Canadian adjudications, from all three perspectives, 
may help identify similarities and differences that explain the 
differences and inaccuracies in reputations or help show that 
their reputations are inaccurate. 
1. Aggressiveness 
The frequency with which states resort to litigation reveals 
much about their aggressiveness.  Traditionally, countries re-
solve issues behind closed doors through diplomatic channels.89  
Taking the unusual step of filing a case against another country 
is a particularly aggressive action for a state.  An examination 
of the number of cases filed by each country can be used to as-
certain a state’s aggressiveness.  Using the number of cases 
filed by individual states may be an imperfect measurement of 
aggressiveness,90 yet it provides a useful tool in comparing the 
United States and Canada and assessing whether they deserve 
their respective reputations.   
  
 88. See, e.g., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 18. 
 89. Alvarez, supra note 85, at 411. 
 90. Examination of the number of cases filed by a country can be a trou-
bling and crude indicator because it involves a “moving target”—i.e., cases and 
disputes are not static.  Furthermore, there may be plenty of disputes that go 
unreported in which other aggressive pressures are brought to bear but where 
a complaint is ultimately not filed.  See Amelia Porges, Settling WTO Dis-
putes: What Do Litigation Models Tell Us?, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
141, 156 (2003).  However, those details are not publicly available and hence 
will not have as large an impact on the reputation of a state as those that are 
more widely known to the public.  A further problem with examining cases 
filed in an effort to get at reputation is that the filing of complaints may be 
limited by the capacity of the legal staff responsible for such cases.  Neither 
the USTR nor the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade have unlimited resources to take on cases.  See, e.g., supra text accom-
panying note 84.  However, staff size in itself reflects the aggressiveness of the 
state, and so the limitation is itself a component in the formation of the repu-
tation. 
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It is unsurprising that the United States has filed more cases 
than Canada, as its economy is greater and more diversified.  In 
2000, the Canadian GDP was $688 billion, while the U.S. GDP 
was nearly ten trillion dollars.91  The U.S. economy is over four-
teen times the size of Canada’s.92  This alone suggests that the 
United States would have to file fourteen times more cases than 
Canada for the two to be comparable.  Examining the actual 
number of the cases is quite revealing.  As of January, 2004, the 
United States had filed seventy-three complaints with the 
WTO,93  while Canada had filed twenty-five.94  The United 
States has filed only three times as many cases as Canada.  
Thus, the United States has filed considerably fewer cases than 
would be expected considering the size of its economy. 
Perhaps, however, a more relevant economic measurement 
for the purposes of this Article is the relative international 
trade figures.  As an initial matter, it is important to note that 
Canada’s economy is heavily weighted to trade with the United 
States.95  With respect to trade in goods, Canada exports over 
85% to and imports almost 74% of its trade from the United 
States; the United States exports approximately 23% of its 
trade to and imports 19% from Canada.96  However, looking at 
the total world trade figures is merely a starting point.  In 2000, 
the United States had 15.44% of the total world exports, while 
Canada had 3.81%.97  In the same year, the United States im-
ported $1.2 trillion and exported $781.9 billion (approximately 
$2 trillion in total trade), while Canada imported $244.6 billion 
and exported $284.6 billion ($529.2 billion in total trade).98  
  
 91. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121,122.  
 92. Id.  
 93. See World Trade Organization, Dispute Settlements: The Disputes, 
Disputes Chronologically, at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/ 
dispu_status_e.htm#2004 (last visited Oct. 6, 2004) [hereinafter WTO Dispute 
Settlement website]; See also UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES INVOLVING THE UNITED STATES (updated Sept. 2, 
2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring 
_Enforcement/Dispute_Settlement/WTO/asset_upload_file84_5696.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES]. 
 94. See WTO Dispute Settlement website, supra note 93. 
 95. THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121. 
 96. Id. at 121, 223. 
 97. Id. at 32. 
 98. Id. at 121, 223. 
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Thus, the U.S. aggregate international trade in goods is about 
four times greater than Canada’s.  However, given that the 
WTO’s Dispute Settlement Understanding covers trade in ser-
vices as well as goods, inclusion of trade in services is pertinent 
to the analysis.  Canada’s trade in services in 2003 was $87 bil-
lion.99  The United States traded $500 billion worth of services 
in 2003.100  Thus, total trade in goods and services for the United 
States is approximately $2.5 trillion and for Canada is $616.2 
billion.   Therefore, we should expect the United States to have 
filed roughly four times the number of cases as Canada.  How-
ever, despite Canada’s reputation, the analysis below shows 
that reality is at variance with expectation.  
As previously noted, the United States has filed seventy-three 
complaints with the WTO101 and Canada has filed twenty-five.102  
The United States has filed fewer than three times the cases 
Canada has filed.  These figures are essentially consistent with 
the differing sizes of the two economies. Yet, an even greater 
differential between the number of WTO cases brought by Can-
ada versus the United States should be expected.  This is be-
cause the bulk of Canada’s trade is with one state and takes 
place under the auspices of NAFTA rather than the WTO.  Ac-
cordingly, many of the disputes will not make it to the WTO’s 
dispute settlement institutions but, rather, will be resolved un-
der NAFTA’s dispute mechanisms.103  Furthermore, because 
  
 99. See Trade and Trade Policy Development, Recent Trends in Interna-
tional Trade and Policy Developments, in WORLD TRADE REPORT 2004, at 20 
(2004), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres04_e/press378_ 
annex_e.pdf ($39 billion in exports, $48 billion in imports). 
 100. Id. ($282 billion in exports, $218 billion in imports). 
 101. See SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES, supra note 93.  
 102. See International Trade Canada, Trade Negotiations and Agreement, 
Dispute Settlement, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/dispute-en.asp 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Canada Dispute Settlement]. 
 103. The NAFTA dispute settlement mechanism comprises a sequence of 
government-to-government consultations, meetings of the NAFTA Free-Trade 
Commission, establishment of an arbitral panel under Chapter 20, arbitral 
measures governed by Chapter 11, binding panel reviews of final antidumping 
and countervailing duty determinations, and an Extraordinary Challenge 
Committee procedure under Chapter 19.  For a summary of the dispute set-
tlement mechanisms, see NAFTA SECRETARIAT, OVERVIEW OF THE DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS OF NAFTA, at http://nafta-sec-alena.org/Default 
Site/dispute/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=8 (last modified May 10, 2004).  See 
NAFTA, supra note 68. 
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Canada has a single primary trade destination, it would seem 
likely that trade tensions would be reduced due to familiarity 
and alternative avenues for dispute resolution (such as lobby-
ing).104   
When these factors are taken into account, one would expect 
Canada to have filed fewer cases with the WTO than it has.  
With the relative information in mind, the WTO figures support 
the view that both states are similarly litigious and, accord-
ingly, similarly aggressive.  Indeed, one could argue that Can-
ada is the more aggressive state because its reputation suggests 
it would file fewer cases.105  This strongly supports the view that 
the reputations of the United States and Canada are not consis-
tent with reality. 
2. Rule-Breaking 
While complaints filed by the United States and Canada may 
reflect how aggressively each state protects its interests, being 
named as a defendant in an international trade dispute may 
reflect perceptions of rule-breaking.106  To date, eighty-two com-
plaints have been filed against the United States.107  Of the 
thirty-eight concluded so far, the United States has prevailed in 
four,108 twelve were resolved without adjudication, and the rest 
are in process.109  Canada, in contrast, has only been a defen-
  
 104. See generally GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC 
PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) (describing the relationship 
of government and industry lobbyists in instituting, prosecuting and derailing 
trade cases and tensions with foreign companies and countries).   
 105. The perception that Canada is less aggressively litigious is based upon 
my interviews of trade practitioners and policymakers, see supra text accom-
panying note 40.  
 106. Cf. Sengupta, supra note 21 (describing the potentially irrecoverable 
reputational impact upon corporations when they are named as defendants in 
lawsuits). 
 107. SNAPSHOT OF WTO CASES, supra note 93. 
 108. Id.  The United States has won on core issues in the following ten 
cases: Sections 301-310 of Trade Act of 1974 (EU); “Shrimp–Turtle” law (In-
dia, et al.) (compliance proceedings); CVD regulations (Canada); AD–steel 
plate (India); CVD–German steel (EU); Section 129(c)(1) URAA (Canada); 
Rules of origin–textiles and apparel products (India); AD–sunset review (Ja-
pan); CVD–softwood lumber (final) (Canada); AD–softwood lumber (final) 
(Canada).  Id. 
 109. Id.  
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dant in seven cases.110  This is significantly less than one would 
expect given the relative sizes of the economies.  Yet, when in-
terstate disputes under NAFTA and CUSFTA are included, the 
numbers change.  The U.S. numbers increase from eighty-two 
to eighty-seven, while Canada’s increase from seven to ten.111 
Respectively, this represents an increase of 6.1% for the United 
States, and 43% for Canada—showing the significance of 
NAFTA/CUSFTA dispute settlement for Canada as compared 
with the United States.112  The ratio of cases in which each state 
is a defendant also changes, with the United States appearing 
as a defendant less often. This expanded ratio compares more 
favorably with the size of each country’s economy and takes into 
account the less diversified Canadian economy.113  While these 
numbers will change over time, they are sufficient to show that 
U.S. and Canadian behavior does not significantly differ with 
respect to perceived rule-breaking.  Certainly, existing differ-
ences between the two countries are not sufficient to explain 
their disparate reputations.  
3. Pivotal Cases  
While empirical analysis helps compare U.S. and Canadian 
trade behaviors, NAFTA and the WTO’s relatively short time of 
operation suggests that reliance upon this analysis alone may 
be problematic.114  Perhaps a better measure would be to exam-
  
 110. See Canada Dispute Settlement, supra note 102. 
 111. For details of NAFTA cases, see NAFTA SECRETARIAT, DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT, PANEL DECISIONS AND REPORTS, at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/DefaultSite/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=76 (last visited Oct. 12, 2004). 
 112. Id. 
 113. A comparison of Canadian economic figures, with its reliance on lim-
ited sectors of its economy for a significant share of its export trade, supports 
the idea that the Canadian economy is relatively less diversified than the U.S. 
economy.  See, e.g., THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 120, 222 (e.g., for Can-
ada—of $284.6 billion in exports—energy, forest, agricultural and vehicle 
exports, at $147.8 billion, take 52% of that total export figure; whereas for the 
United States it does not appear so easy to isolate specific sectors as constitut-
ing a large portion of the export economy). 
 114. The World Trade Organization was established in 1994, pursuant to 
the Marrakesh Agreement.  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE 
URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 
U.N.T.S. 154, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].  The estab-
lishment of NAFTA dates to 1992.  NAFTA, supra note 68. 
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ine the cases themselves, with a focus on the particularly high-
profile disputes.  The following section shows that both states 
may have expended resources on cases viewed with significant 
revulsion by other parts of the world, yet their reputations have 
not changed as a result. 
Interestingly, the United States and Canada have frequently 
been involved in the same controversial cases.115  A classic ex-
ample is the Beef Hormones case,116  where the United States 
was, and continues to be, castigated for its involvement.117  De-
pictions of the United States forcing hormone-laced beef on a 
health-conscious European community were widespread.118  Yet 
Canada was an equal partner in the dispute, though it escaped 
  
 115. The United States was involved in the Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (Shrimp–Turtle case), the Definitive Safeguard 
Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products (Steel Safeguards case), and 
many other cases that have received negative responses from around the 
world.   Interestingly, Canada has also been involved in some of these cases.  
WTO Report of the Appellate Body, United States–Import Prohibition of Cer-
tain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), 38 I.L.M. 
118 (1999) [hereinafter Shrimp–Turtle Case]; WTO Report of the Appellate 
Body, United States–Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain 
Steel Products, WT/DS248/AB/R, WT/DS249/AB/R, WT/DS251/AB/R, 
WT/DS252/AB/R, WT/DS253/AB/R, WT/DS254/AB/R, WT/DS258/AB/R, 
WT/DS259/AB/R (Dec. 10, 2003); see also, Mike Dolan, A Generation Takes a 
Stand, TIME MAG., Mar. 31, 2003, at 72 (environmentalists from around the 
world have protested the U.S. position in the Shrimp-Turtle case).   
 116. WTO Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities–Measures 
Affecting Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [herein-
after WTO Beef Hormones case].  In the Beef Hormones case, the Appellate 
Body considered two panel reports, composed of the same three panelists, 
following a merger of the panel established at the request of the United States 
in May 1996 and the Panel established in October 1996 at the request of Can-
ada.  Id. para. 1.  The complaint concerned a prohibition by the European 
Communities of imports of meat and meat products derived from cattle ad-
ministered natural or synthetic hormones to promote growth.  Id. para. 2.  
The Appellate Body concluded that the prohibitions violated the Agreement 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, as the prohibi-
tions were not based on risk assessment under Article 5.1. of that agreement.  
Id. para. 253. 
 117. Shelley Emling, U.S., European Union Toe-to-Toe Over Trade Issues, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 2, 2003, at D1. 
 118. Marc Victor, Precaution or Protectionism? The Precautionary Principle, 
Genetically Modified Organisms, and Allowing Unfounded Fear to Undermine 
Free Trade, 14 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 295, 309–10 (2001). 
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with its reputation unscathed.119  Although the United States 
and Canada prevailed at the WTO, many Europeans remain 
very upset about the decision and have been slow to comply 
with the ruling.120  The decision engendered much passion in 
Europe,121 so much so that that the EU has suffered serious 
trade retaliation as a result.122  The EU’s reaction to the Beef 
Hormones decision reflects a widely-held belief that Americans’ 
unhealthy lifestyle and an American culture is being foisted on 
the rest of the world—a culture rampant with large and noxious 
feedlots and concomitant use of hormones and antibiotics.123  
Yet, despite its involvement in the case, the negative view of the 
United States has not been extended to Canada.124   
While Canada has been allied with the United States in many 
of the WTO’s most contentious cases, it has also had its own 
contentious cases.  Indeed, perhaps one of the most notorious 
cases in the WTO pantheon is the Asbestos case, where Canada 
was squarely in the line of fire.125  The Asbestos case, described 
simply, was a case in which the EU defended against a Cana-
dian challenge to a French import prohibition on asbestos prod-
ucts.126  While there were valid arguments concerning which 
  
 119. WTO Beef Hormones case, supra note 116.  Canada and the United 
States brought simultaneous cases on the same issues.  Id. 
 120. Indeed, the Europeans recently announced that they would make per-
manent the ban on products containing at least one of the disputed hormones.  
See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, WTO/NAFTA 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT UPDATE 2 (March 9, 2004), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Monitoring_Enforcement/Dispu
te_Settlement/asset_upload_file316_5697.pdf.  
 121. George H. Rountree, Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World 
Trade Organization’s Decision in the European Union–United States Beef Dis-
pute, 27 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 607, 609 (1999).  Among European misgivings 
are fears of hormone-impacted baby food.  See Kristen Mueller, Note, Hormo-
nal Imbalance: An Analysis of the Hormone-Treated Beef Trade Dispute Be-
tween the United States and the European Union, 1 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 97, 102 
(1996) (discussing other European concerns about beef from hormone-treated 
cattle).   
 122. See Daniel Wüger, The Never-Ending Story: The Implementation Phase 
in the Dispute Between the EC and the United States on Hormone-Treated 
Beef, 33 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 777, 795 (2002).  
 123. See Rountree, supra note 121, at 609.  
 124. Id. 
 125. WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9. 
 126. The regulation in question was French Decree No. 96-1133 Concerning 
Asbestos and Products Containing Asbestos (Decree), which entered into force 
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provisions of the WTO were applicable to the disputed regula-
tion,127 the case also challenged French attempts to protect 
themselves from what they considered harmful asbestos prod-
ucts.128  The Canadians, in contrast, argued that the first WTO 
panel erred in finding that the asbestos at issue poses a risk to 
human health.129   
Despite the fact that Canada approved the appointed experts, 
Canada challenged their findings that the asbestos was car-
cinogenic and could not be safely contained.130  The WTO Appel-
late body ruled against Canada on this issue, with some sting-
ing commentary from one of the judges.131  It is hard to find a 
case less defensible. Yet, once again, international disdain for 
Canada’s position does not appear to have lingered for a suffi-
  
1 January 1997.  Le Journal Officiel de la République Française [Official 
Journal of the French Republic] 1996, Décret no 96-1133 du 24 décembre 1996 
relatif à l'interdiction de l'amiante, pris en application du code du travail et du 
code de la consummation [Decree No. 96-1133 of December 24, 1996 relative 
to the prohibition of asbestos, pursuant to the code of fair labor standards and 
the consumption act], available at http://droit.org/jo/19961226/TAST 
9611675D.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).  Article 1 set forth a general pro-
hibition on asbestos or products containing asbestos fibers. Id. Article 2 set 
limited and temporary exceptions for materials containing chrysotile fiber.  Id. 
 127. Canada maintained that the Decree fell within the scope of the Agree-
ment on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), and that the Panel’s 
refusal to consider its allegations under this agreement should be reversed as 
an error of law.  WTO Asbestos Report, supra note 9, para. 10–14. Specifically, 
Canada argued that the Panel incorrectly considered the prohibitions and 
exceptions in the Decree to be separate measures in determining whether the 
Decree constituted a “technical regulation” under the TBT Agreement; that it 
misinterpreted the definition of “technical regulation;” and that it erred in 
concluding that the TBT Agreement did not apply to a general prohibition like 
the one in the Decree.  Id. 
 128. Id. para. 16. 
 129. Id. para 158 (Canada argued that the panel erred “in finding that there 
is a risk to human health associated with the manipulation of chrysotile-
cement [asbestos] products.”). 
 130. Id. para. 19.  
 131. Id. para. 152.  As stated in the opinon: 
It is difficult for me to imagine what evidence relating to economic 
competitive relationships as reflected in end-uses and consumers' 
tastes and habits could outweigh and set at naught the undisputed 
deadly nature of chrysotile asbestos fibers, compared with PCG fi-
bers, when inhaled by humans, and thereby compel a characteriza-
tion of "likeness" of chrysotile asbestos and PCG fibers. 
Id. 
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cient period to influence Canada’s reputation in the same way 
that more defensible American positions have sullied the repu-
tation of the United States.132   
Though Canada has been involved in significantly fewer cases 
before the WTO, it is nonetheless easy to show its involvement, 
either directly or in a supportive role, in some of the most criti-
cized cases among the WTO and other trade regimes.133   Were 
one to simply look at the details of international trade cases 
involving the United States and Canada, it is unlikely that 
there would be a sufficient basis to support the differences in 
their trade reputations.  
C. Protectionism 
Trade reputations are not solely forged battles before dispute 
resolution bodies.  They are also formed with respect to states’ 
internal actions.  Within the world trade system, good players 
are states that employ protectionist measures sparingly and 
transparently.134  The United States, however, has the reputa-
  
 132. Shrimp–Turtle Case, supra note 115; Report of the WTO Appellate 
Body, European Communities–Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribu-
tion of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (September 9, 1997), 37 I.L.M. 243 (1998).  
The United States’ involvement in the Turtles and Bananas cases was far 
more defensible, yet it still faced widespread criticism.  See, e.g., Dolan, supra 
note 115.  Additionally, I surveyed the law review articles available on the 
Westlaw database for articles comparing the Asbestos case to the Bananas 
case.  This unscientific, yet telling, survey showed that significantly greater 
attention was provided to the American Bananas case than to the Canadian 
Asbestos case. 
 133. Similarly, there are other examples of contentious cases outside the 
WTO.  For example, a particularly egregious case is the NAFTA case under 
CUSFTA regarding the U.S. lobster fisheries.  NAFTA Arbitral Panel Report, 
United States Regulations on Lobster, USA-89-1807-01 (May 25, 1990) avail-
able at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute/english/ 
FTA_Chapter_18/USA/uc89010e.pdf [hereinafter Lobsters Case].  In the Lob-
sters Case, Canada tried to have a U.S. conservation regulation on lobster 
catch sizes thrown out under the Free Trade Agreement. Id. (The United 
States enacted an amendment to the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act to prohibit the sale, transport in or from the United 
States of whole live lobsters smaller than the minimum possession size in 
effect under U.S. federal law).  The Panel, however, ruled in favor of the 
United States, finding that the United States conservation measure was not 
in violation of the obligations of the United States under CUSFTA.  Id. para. 
11.1.1–11.2. 
 134. See generally WTO Agreement, supra note 117, pmbl.   
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tion of aggressively employing its domestic trade remedies in a 
manner that results in protectionism.135  Further, it has a repu-
tation for providing subsidies for a range of products in order to 
protect domestic industries.136  The United States is, conse-
quently, not considered a good player with respect to protection-
ist trade policies. 
In particular, the United States is criticized for its utilization 
and administration of safeguard, antidumping, and anti-
subsidy (countervailing duty) remedies.137  Employment of these 
mechanisms is viewed, rightly or wrongly, as essentially protec-
tionist.138  In part, as a direct response to the historical percep-
tion and criticism of the United States’ protectionist practices, 
the WTO negotiations included specific agreements on anti-
dumping, countervailing duties, and safeguards.139  Indeed, an-
tidumping and countervailing duty actions are almost synony-
mous with U.S. trade law.140   
  
 135. See, e.g., Rebecca Kanter, United States v. Nippon Paper Industries: 
Price-Fixing Conspiracy or Trade Remedy?, 8 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 
165, 178 (2003). 
 136. See, e.g., Randolph B. Persaud, Shades of American Hegemony: The 
Primitive, the Enlightened, and the Benevolent, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN 
AFF. 165, 178 (2003). 
 137. See, e.g., Dr. Mario E. Carranza, Mercosur, the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas, and the Future of the U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 1063 (2004).  
 138. See, e.g., Kelly Henry, Is the United States the World’s Dumping 
Ground for Steel? Recent Influxes in Steel Imports in the United States, the 
Effects, and the Possible Remedies, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 381, 383–84 (2003); E. 
Kwaku Andoh, Countervailing Duties in a Not Quite Perfect World: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1515, 1516, 1525–27 (1992). 
 139. See generally Christopher F. Corr, Trade Protection in the New Millen-
nium: the Ascendancy of Antidumping Measures, 18 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 49, 
54–55 (1997) (describing the history of antidumping rules and the increasing 
usage of antidumping measures); Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Remedies Against Un-
fair International Trade Practices, SE06 ALI-ABA 337 (1999) (“The Uruguay 
Round Agreements Act resulted in approximately 70 changes to United States 
antidumping and countervailing duty laws.”); Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert 
T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Subsidies Agreements: Did the 
United States Achieve its Objectives During the Uruguay Round?, 31 LAW & 
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 871, 873–74 (2000) (describing the defensive policy objectives 
of U.S. negotiators during the Uruguay Round). 
 140. Recent statistics show that the U.S. is responsible for 72% of counter-
vailing duties, whereas Canada is responsible for 6%.  J.G. Castel & C.M. 
Gastle, Deep Economic Integration Between Canada and the United States, 
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Canada’s actions in this sphere, however, are not much dif-
ferent than those of the United States.  Canada, like the United 
States, engages in a fair amount of activity that should perturb 
the international trading community.  Canada, like other ad-
vanced industrialized states, is a heavy user and innovator of 
these and other trade remedies.141  Indeed, Canada had the first 
antidumping law in 1904, a full sixteen years before the first 
real U.S antidumping law in 1921.142  Another particularly prob-
lematic form of protectionism, known as the voluntary restraint 
agreement (VRA), originated in Canada.143  Just as the world 
trading community’s response to U.S. protectionist mechanisms 
led to innovative agreements, the VRA was also explicitly pro-
hibited in the WTO.144  Similarly, it was prohibitive Canadian 
restrictions on foreign investments that led to the WTO’s 
Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMs).145 
Examples of such similarity are not confined to history.  Can-
ada, like the United States, continues to have protectionist 
problems.  These issues are raised in the generally neutral 
WTO report on Canada.146  For example, despite significant re-
ductions in the majority of goods subject to tariffs, Canada still 
maintains significant tariffs on textiles, boats, footwear, cloth-
ing, wine, cider, sugar, vegetables (during their growing sea-
  
The Emergence of Strategic Innovation Policy and the Need for Trade Law 
Reform, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 9 n.28 (1998). 
 141. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 41–48.  E.g., more 
than thirty-five countries are subject to Canada’s antidumping measures.  Id. 
at 44. 
 142. HART, supra note 60, at 182. 
 143. Id. at 193. 
 144. Agreement on Safeguards, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Estab-
lishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, art. 11(1)(b), THE LEGAL 
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE 
NEGOTIATIONS (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S 275, available at http://www.wto.org/ 
english/docs_e/legal_e/25-safeg.pdf. 
 145. See Foreign Investment Review Act, Act of Dec. 12, 1973, Ch. 46, 1973-
74 F.C. 619 (Can.), as amended (repealed 1985). This Canadian law led to a 
GATT panel decision, which in turn lead to the WTO’s TRIMS Agreement. See 
Canada Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act, Feb. 7, 1984, 
GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.) at 140, 143–44 (1984).  See also JACKSON, supra 
note 59, at 1137. 
 146. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 33.  See also, William 
Watson, Editorial, Why Does a Tiger Need Tariffs?, NAT’L POST, Mar. 19, 2003, 
at 19 (addressing the WTO Trade Policy Review of Canada from March 14, 
2003). 
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son), and on cut flowers.147  Another problematic area concerns 
the numerous State Trading Enterprises148 that cover such sec-
tors as alcoholic beverages, dairy products, fish, and wheat.149   
A specific area of recent concern is the steel industry. The 
United States received tremendous criticism recently over the 
protection of its steel industry.  The close ties between the U.S. 
and Canadian steel industries suggested that there was a seri-
ous possibility that Canada may have joined in this protection-
ism.150  Ottawa has managed, however, to avoid applying the 
same steel safeguards imposed by President Bush.  Indeed, the 
Canadian International Trade Tribunal determined that tariffs 
should be imposed, although Ottawa ultimately rejected the 
recommendation.151  Nonetheless, Ottawa considered working 
closely with the United States on joint efforts to deal with this 
“problem” and in formation of the North American Steel Trade 
Committee to work out a joint response.152  Canada’s continuing 
protectionist practices reinforce the similarities between the 
two states’ trade behaviors. 
This discussion should not be read as equating Canadian pro-
tectionist measures with the United States in all instances.  For 
example, there is no Canadian equivalent to the globally un-
popular U.S. section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.153  Interna-
tionally, section 301 is perhaps the most despised domestic 
  
 147. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 33.   
 148. See, e.g., Michael T. Roberts, The Unique Role of State Trading Enter-
prises in World Agriculture Trade: Sifting Through Rhetoric, 6 DRAKE J. 
AGRIC. L. 287, 290 (2001) (“Loosely defined, STEs are enterprises authorized 
to engage in trade and owned, sanctioned, or otherwise supported by the gov-
ernment.  Special or exclusive privileges granted by their governments allow 
STEs to influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of 
trade in their commodities.”). 
 149. WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 75; see also Roberts, supra 
note 148, at 294. 
 150. Indeed, steel is a primary focus of recent Canadian domestic trade 
measures. See, e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 44–45. 
 151. David Pannon, Steelworkers Union Wants Provinces to Push Ottawa to 
Penalize Cheap Imports, CAN. PRESS, October 6, 2003, available at 2003 WL 
65007279. 
 152. Id.  
 153. Trade Act § 310 (The Act allows the President to take action against 
any country which has acted against the trade interests of the United States). 
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trade law.154  Indeed, the United States employment of section 
301 provided the stimulus at the Uruguay Round for the crea-
tion of binding dispute settlement procedures to wean the 
United States from employment of its unilateral Section 301 
actions.155  Alternatively, Canada has historically used globally 
unpopular protective devices, such as cultural protections, not 
available in the United States.156  At times these protective de-
vices have fallen afoul of Canadian international trade com-
mitments.157  A salient example of cultural protectionism can be 
found in the WTO Magazines case.158  In that case, Canada at-
tempted to protect Canadian magazines by restricting foreign 
advertising in Canadian versions of foreign magazines.159  The 
WTO found Canadian measures to be a violation of Canada’s 
national treatment obligations under the WTO.160 
In addition to trade remedies, protections may also take the 
form of assistance to industry or other sectors of the economy.  
Indeed, large subsidies provided to agriculture have caused the 
United States’ reputation to suffer tremendously in recent 
years.161  Despite talk by the U.S. government of its commitment 
to trade liberalization and reducing barriers around the world, 
the farm subsidies in the Farm Security and Rural Investment 
  
 154. Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global 
Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn From Mediators, Business 
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 575 
n. 37 (2002). 
 155. See, e.g., Robert E. Hudec, The New WTO Dispute Settlement Proce-
dure: An Overview of the First Three Years, 8 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 13–14 
(1999). 
 156. Id.  See generally Ronald G. Atkey, Canadian Cultural Industries Ex-
emption From NAFTA – Its Parameters, 23 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 177, 184 (1997) 
(providing examples of other cultural industries and protection issues in Can-
ada).  
 157. See Oliver R. Goodenough, Defending the Imaginary to the Death? Free 
Trade, National Identity, and Canada’s Cultural Preoccupation, 15 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 203, 210–21 (1998).  
 158. Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada – Certain Measures Con-
cerning Periodicals, WT/DS31/AB/R, at 449 (June 30, 1997) (WTO Doc # 97-
2653).  
 159. Id.  
 160. Id. at 479–80.  
 161. See, e.g., World Digest: Mexican and U.S. Lawmakers Talk Trade, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, May 16, 2004, at A15; What U.S. Can Do Before 2005,  
Jan. 18, 2004, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, at 4H. 
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Act of 2002 (2002 Farm Act)162 shocked the global trading com-
munity.163   The 2002 Farm Act reversed the move towards lib-
eralization of U.S. agriculture that started in the 1996 farm 
bill.164  The 2002 Farm Act authorized the expenditure of tens of 
billions of dollars in subsidies over a ten-year period.165  The in-
ternational trading community was stunned and dismayed by 
this change of direction.166  The subsidies continue to impinge 
upon the United States’ reputation as a champion of free 
trade.167 
Canada has no shortage of domestic subsidies either, includ-
ing significant protections for its vast agricultural sector.168  His-
torically, while Canada has pushed agricultural trade reform, it 
was politically unable to dispense with protections for some of 
its agricultural sectors.169  For example, Canada’s dairy and 
poultry sectors are protected from international competition.170  
These sectors are regulated under a “supply management” 
framework.171  The dairy sector has received over a third of the 
government’s subsidy monies and has its production strictly 
controlled through the Canadian Milk Supply Management 
Committee.172  Other agricultural recipients of economic support 
include those sectors taking part in the Spring Credit Advance 
Program, which allows them to receive interest-free, govern-
  
 162. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-171, 
116 Stat. 134 (2002). 
 163. Clete D. Johnson, A Barren Harvest for the Developing World? Presi-
dential “Trade Promotion Authority” and the Unfulfilled Promise of Agricul-
ture Negotiations in the Doha Round, 32 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 437, 442 
(2004). 
 164. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, 
AGRICULTURAL POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES 205 (2003), available at 
http://www1.oecd.org/publications/e-book/5103081E.PDF (last visited Oct. 13, 
2004) [hereinafter OECD AGRICULTURAL POLICIES]. 
 165. See, e.g., Tom Carter, U.S. Farm Policy Sows Ire in Africa, WASH. 
TIMES, July 3, 2003, at A16.  
 166. Johnson, supra note 163, at 442. 
 167. Id.  
 168. See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 94–105. 
 169. See HART, supra note 60, at 446.  Canada accomplished this by elimi-
nating subsidies, rationalizing protectionist measures and generally moving 
the sector to be more in tune with the advances in other economic sectors.  Id. 
 170. Id.  See WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at ix, para. 17.   
 171. Dale E. McNiel, The NAFTA Panel Decision on Canadian Tariff–Rate 
Quotas: Imagining A Tariffying Bargain, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 345, 349 (1997). 
 172. OECD AGRICULTURAL POLICIES, supra note 164, at 121. 
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ment-guaranteed loans to assist in planting.173  Additional sub-
sidies are supplied through the Crop Insurance Program, which 
has made record payments in recent years because of ongoing 
drought conditions.174  Admittedly, Canada has recently em-
barked on a New Agricultural Policy Framework.175  However, it 
remains unclear what impact this Framework will have on Ca-
nadian agricultural subsidies and protections.   
As evidence of the impact these protections should have on 
Canada’s reputation, Canada’s agricultural protections have 
repeatedly been the subject of dispute settlement proceedings at 
the WTO and NAFTA.176  For example, the Canadian dairy and 
poultry supply management system was challenged in the first 
state-to-state settlement proceedings before the NAFTA.177   
Thus, Canada, like the United States, has gone to great lengths 
to protect its agricultural sector.   
To the extent agricultural protections influence world reputa-
tion, the similarity between Canadian and U.S.  agricultural 
protections suggests that the reputations of the two should be 
comparable.  Furthermore, agriculture is merely one example of 
the similarities between the two states in engaging in protec-
tionist measures to safeguard domestic industries and inter-
ests.178 While there are differences in their protectionist styles, 
  
 173. Id.  
 174. Id. at 122.   
 175. Id.  
 176. See, e.g., Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada–Measures Affect-
ing the Importation of Milk and the Exportation of Dairy Products, 
WT/DS103/AB/RW2 (Dec. 20, 2002), WT/DS103/AB/R/Corr.1 (Oct. 18, 1999), 
WT/DS103/AB/R (Oct. 13, 1999), available at  http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/distabase_wto_members1_e.htm; FTA Ch. 18 Arbitral Panel 
Report, The Interpretation of and Canada's Compliance With Article 701.3 
With Respect to Durum Wheat Sales, CDA-92-1807-01 (Feb. 8, 1993) [CUSFTA 
Case], available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/ 
Dispute/english/FTA_Chapter_18/Canada/cc92010e.pdf. 
 177. NAFTA Ch. 20 Arbitral Panel Report, Tariffs Applied by Canada to 
Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products, CDA-95-2008-01 (Dec. 2, 1996), 
available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/app/DocRepository/1/Dispute% 
5Cenglish%5CNAFTA_Chapter_20%5CCanada%5Ccb95010e.pdf. 
 178. Compare the Canadian attempts to protect its aviation sector with that 
of the United States.  Compare Report of the WTO Appellate Body, Canada–
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/AB/R (Aug. 2, 
1999) (Doc # 99-3221), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/DDFDocuments 
/t/WT/DS/70ABR.DOC, and Helena D. Sullivan, Regional Jet Trade Wars: 
Politics and Compliance in WTO Dispute Resolution, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL 
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these differences do not justify the significant differences in 
reputation. 
D. Additional Evidence of Reputational Differences Between the 
United States and Canada 
In addition to the previously mentioned trade irritants prac-
ticed by the United States, there are a host of peripheral issues 
that contribute to the U.S. position in the world trading system.  
Some of these issues will be discussed below; however, it should 
be noted that there are too many to be covered within the scope 
of this Article.  Like the previous section, this section will com-
pare U.S. actions and equivalent or comparable Canadian ac-
tions. 
One of the most contentious international trade issues is the 
use of WTO commitments to open markets to new and troubling 
technological and scientific developments.179  Examples include 
the use of beef hormones, genetically–modified food, and wide-
spread use of antibiotics in livestock.180  The United States is 
heavily criticized for pushing the technological envelope despite 
concerns about the harmful effects of these new technologies.181  
Yet, in almost all of these areas the United States is not alone.  
Canada also pushes the envelope with respect to these same 
areas—no doubt a reflection of their similar economies.182    
Another divisive area in international trade is the inclusion of 
allegedly “non-trade”-related issues such as environmental, la-
bor, and human rights into trade agreements.183  The United 
States has periodically pushed for the inclusion of environ-
  
TRADE 71 (2003), with Daniel I. Fisher, “Super Jumbo” Problem: Boeing, Air-
bus, and the Battle for the Geopolitical Future, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865 
(2002), and European Commission Offers to Review Aircraft Subsidies Pact, 
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Aug. 20, 2004, at http://www.insidetrade.com/secure 
/wto_iust.asp. 
 179. Daniel Kalderimis, Problems of WTO Harmonization and the Virtues of 
Shields Over Swords, 13 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 323–26 (2004).  
 180. Id. 
 181. Joe Garofali, Genetically Altered Food at Heart of Controversy/Activists 
Protest Sacramento Meeting of Ag Ministers, S.F. CHRON., June 23, 2003, at 
A1. 
 182. See, e.g., WTO Trade Policy Review, supra note 79, at 17. 
 183. See generally Steve Charnovitz, Linking Topics in Treaties, 19 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 329 (1998) (describing the trend of U.S. negotiators to link trade 
agreements and labor and environmental side agreements). 
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mental safeguards and labor rights in trade agreements.184  
Their inclusion in NAFTA was at the United States’s instiga-
tion.185  These “non-trade”-related commitments are highly un-
popular in much of the world.186  They are often considered unre-
lated to traditional notions of international trade and, instead, 
are thought of as attempts by interest groups in the developed 
world, such as organized labor, to provide hidden protectionist 
benefits.187  It is argued that enforcement of labor, environ-
mental, and human rights provisions would erode the compara-
tive advantage of developing states where, for example, labor 
inputs are cheap and environmental regulations are either un-
enforced or nonexistent.188  Perceptions of states’ human rights 
enforcement, conversely, are often viewed as easily manipulated 
by outside states for their own political goals.  Furthermore, the 
content and coverage of human rights provisions can reflect the 
requesting party’s cultural biases.189  Due in part to concerns, for 
example, that environmental issues will come back to haunt it, 
Canada has not been as assertive as the United States on these 
issues.  Still, Canada has continued to argue for the inclusion of 
  
 184. See, e.g., Mohammad Nsour, Fundamental Facets of the United States-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement: E-Commerce, Dispute Resolution, and Beyond, 
27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 742, 779-80 (2004). 
 185. See The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation 
(NAAEC), Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 1480; North American 
Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), Sept. 14, 1993, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 
32 I.L.M. 1499.  See also Sarah Lowe, The First American Case Under the 
North American Agreement for Labor Cooperation, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 481, 
487–88 (1997); Kal Raustiala, The Political Implications of the Enforcement 
Provisions of the NAFTA Environmental Side Agreement: The CEC as a Model 
for Future Accords, 35 ENVTL. L. 31, 35–36 (1995). 
 186. Padideh Ala’i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Preliminary 
Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 537, 551 (2001). 
 187. Philip M. Nichols, Realism, Liberalism, Values, and the World Trade 
Organization, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 725, 752 (2004). 
 188. Arthur E. Appleton, Telecommunications Trade: Reach Out and Touch 
Someone?, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 209, 215 (1998).  
 189. See generally Matthew A. Ritter, “Human Rights”: Would You Recog-
nize One If You Saw One?  A Philosophical Hearing of International Rights 
Talk, 27 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 265 (1997) (describing the internationalization of 
human rights talk and the difficulties inherent in these talks due to variations 
in language, culture and philosophy).  
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core labor standards and multilateral environmental agree-
ments in the WTO.190 
A related area of great international concern is the use of 
trade to further national security and foreign policies.191  Of par-
ticular importance is use by the United States of unilateral ex-
port controls, sanctions, and embargoes to further its own for-
eign policy and national security goals.192  Controls, such as the 
embargo on Cuba,193 raise considerable ire around the world.194  
This is particularly true when controls are imposed extraterri-
torially on non-U.S. persons.195  Sometimes, states even go so far 
as to enact laws specifically prohibiting their citizens from com-
plying with U.S. laws.196  These U.S. actions have done much to 
tarnish its reputation.197   
  
 190. See Center for International Developments at Harvard, Global Trade 
Negotiations Homepage: Canada Summary, at http://www.cid.harvard.edu 
/cidtrade/gov/canadagov.html (last visited Oct. 13, 2004); see also WTO Trade 
Policy Review, supra note 79, at 20. 
 191. See, e.g., Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Trade Controls for Political Ends: Four 
Perspectives, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 355, 362 (2003) (opposition to U.S. Siberian pipe-
line policy); John W. Boscariol, An Anatomy of a Cuban Pyjama Crisis: Recon-
sidering Blocking Legislation in Response to Extraterritorial Trade Measures 
of the United States, 30 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 439 (1999) (U.S. trade policy 
with respect to Cuba). 
 192. See, e.g., Iranian Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. Part 535. 
 193. Cuban Democracy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. § 6000-6010 (Supp. V. 1993) 
(prohibiting any person, corporation in the United States or any foreign sub-
sidiary of a U.S. corporation, from trading with Cuba, except under specified 
circumstances). 
 194. See generally Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanc-
tions and Foreign Countermeasures, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (2004) (de-
scribing challenges to U.S. extraterritorial sanctions under international 
trade agreements); see George Kleinfeld & Deborah Wengel, Foreign Invest-
ment, 31 INT’L LAW. 403, 411 (1997). 
 195. See, e.g., Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, 
110 Stat. 1541 (1996) (imposing sanctions on any person making large in-
vestments of a type that would aid Iran or Libya in developing petroleum 
resources or weapons systems).    
 196. See, e.g., “Ley de Proteccion al Comercio y la Inversion de Normas Ex-
tranjeras que Contravengan el Derecho Internacional,” D.O., 23 de octubre de 
1996 (Mex.), translated in Mexico: Act to Protect Trade and Investment From 
Foreign Norms That Contravene International Law, 36 I.L.M. 133 (1997) 
(Mexico’s blocking statute against the Helms-Burton Act). 
 197. Natalie Maniaci, The Helms-Burton Act:  Is the U.S. Shooting Itself in 
the Foot?, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 897, 909 (1998). 
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Canada also has foreign policy and national security sanction 
laws.  Yet, the bulk of Canada’s sanctions are multilateral, pur-
suant to United Nations Security Council resolutions.198  None-
theless, Canada reserves the right to enact unilateral or multi-
lateral sanctions that are not Security Council-authorized.199  
Still, this is a far cry from the sanctions and embargoes pursued 
by the United States.  Trade behaviors that further national 
security and foreign policy goals provide an example of differ-
ences between the two states, though one which may simply 
reflect U.S. involvement in geopolitics to an extent not shared 
by Canada.  Thus, these few examples generally show that even 
in peripheral areas of international trade there are insufficient 
differences to justify the two states’ dissimilar reputations. 
IV. REPUTATIONAL FALLACY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
As discussed earlier, reputation is viewed as an important 
mechanism in the smooth operation of the international legal 
system.200  Yet, as the previous section demonstrates, reputation 
may not reflect the reality of state behavior.  The disparity be-
tween a state’s reputation and its behavior leads to a few ques-
tions: (1) what is the source of this reputational disparity,  (2) 
what is or should be the real role of reputation in international 
law, and (3) what are the consequences if state reputation is not 
reasonably related to state actions?  In exploring possible an-
swers to these questions, the following section will delve into 
potential factors outside the trade arena that may influence 
reputation.  The discussion will then turn to the benefits for 
individual states and the international legal system when repu-
tation is scrutinized and reputational fallacies are exposed. 
  
 198. See, e.g., United Nations Act, R.S.C., ch. U-2 (1985) (Can.); Special 
Economic Measures Act, S.C., ch. 17 (1992) (Can.); Export and Import Permits 
Act, R.S.C., ch. E-19 (1985) (Can.).  See also International Trade Canada, Ca-
nadian Economic Sanctions, at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/trade/sanctions-
en.asp (last visited Oct. 13, 2004). 
 199. See, e.g., The Special Economic Measures Act, R.S.C., ch. 17 § 4(1) 
(1992) (Can.) (allowing the Governor in Council to order seizure or freeze any 
property held by foreign states of foreign nationals when s/he believes there 
has been a grave breach of international peace and security).  
 200. See Guzman, supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
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A. Non-Trade Action Sources of International Legal Reputations 
The previous section of this Article showed that similarities 
in the behavior of Canada and the United States in interna-
tional trade produced disparate international reputations for 
the two states.  While there may be a whole host of reasons for 
this phenomenon, two possible causes stand out: reputational 
spill-over and differing levels of interaction among states.  In 
other words, the general reputation of the United States or 
Canada in international affairs spills over into the trade arena 
and/or other states have radically different levels of interaction 
vis-à-vis the United States and Canada, with a concomitantly 
different impact upon each state’s reputation. 
States’ reputations are not based solely on a state’s activities 
within one specific field.  Rather, their reputations reflect the 
whole gamut of their behavior across widely-dispersed fields.  
Reputation earned in one or more fields may “spill-over” into 
another field.  Thus, isolating cause and effect in the creation of 
state reputation within one remote field can be difficult, if not 
impossible.  While it is true that reputation can be established 
narrowly within a field by looking at a single action, when ex-
amining the field as a whole it is harder to isolate the cause of 
that reputation.201  This is especially true for a state such as the 
United States, which is very active in many parts of the inter-
national environment and tends to have a profound impact on 
the world in many different arenas.   
Unfortunately, and for reasons beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle, the generalized world impression of the United States is 
strongly negative.202  For example, the United States is the 
global symbol of negative market forces such as capitalism, 
globalization, and the spread of materialism—despite the fact 
that other states are equally involved in these movements.203  
  
 201. A narrow area for establishing reputation could be paying United Na-
tions membership dues; however, expanding the analysis to a state’s general 
relationship with the United Nations or other multilateral institutions makes 
determination of the exact factors influencing reputation extremely difficult.  
But see Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 109–10 (claiming that states have 
multiple reputations in varying international arenas). 
 202. See, e.g., Christopher Marquis, Public Relations Chief Admits U.S. Has 
a Big Image Problem, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 6, 2004, at 5. 
 203. See Elemer Hankiss, Symbols of Destruction, in SOCIAL SCIENCE 
RESEARCH COUNCIL: ESSAYS ON 9/11 (2001) (describing the U.S. position as the 
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With the widespread unpopularity of these movements at vari-
ous times, anti-Americanism has become commonplace.204  In-
deed, there is now a visceral negative reaction by many around 
the world to anything American.205  Anti-Americanism has itself 
become a part of the world’s culture.206  True, there are periods 
where negative responses to America are momentarily replaced 
with a more positive view, such as after the World Trade Center 
attack,207 or in Eastern Europe for the brief period following the 
fall of Communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union.208  
However, the default view is that America and its international 
activities reflect the wrong side of an issue.209  Given the depth 
of feeling arrayed against the United States, it would not be 
surprising if some negative feelings were directed at the activi-
ties of the United States in international trade, regardless of 
actual U.S. trade activities.    
Consequently, the world’s negative view of U.S. trade activi-
ties, and its correspondingly more positive view of Canada’s, is 
predictable in light of the “spill-over” effect.  The “spill-over” 
effect appears to exist despite the fact that specialized state of-
ficials may come to know the reputation of a state in a specific 
field.  This may occur because a state, while having different 
compliance rates within specific fields, will still have an over-
arching reputation driven by national strategies, domestic poli-
tics, constitutional concerns, traditional relationships, and so 
  
symbolic center of the world—albeit before 9/11), at http://www.ssrc.org/ 
sept11/essays/hankiss.htm.  
 204. See, e.g., Jonah Goldberg, Europe on the Whine, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, 
June 13, 2001, at http://www.nationalreview.com/goldberg/goldberg061301. 
shtml; World Edition Quiz: How widespread is Anti-Americanism?, BBC 
NEWS, Jan. 7, 2003, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2635419.stm.  
 205. Goldberg, supra note 204; World Edition Quiz, supra note 204. 
 206. See, e.g., Opinions, What Did We Do Now? Our Stand: America Again 
Object of Hate, Obsession, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Feb. 29, 2004, at V4.  
 207. See, e.g., Richard Bernstein, Two Years Later: World Opinion; Foreign 
Views of U.S. Darken After Sept 11, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting 
that while “world sympathy and support” for the United States was wide-
spread immediately after September 11, such support has since declined). 
 208. See, e.g., Gareth Harding, EU Expansion Good for the U.S., UNITED 
PRESS INT’L, Dec. 24, 2002, at A1 (noting that many Central and Eastern 
Europeans were pro-American after the fall of communism, but that the “pro-
American euphoria of the early ‘90s has worn off”). 
 209. This is not to say such views are right or wrong, simply that they exist.  
See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 40. 
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on.210  The overarching reputation may spill over into the minds 
of practitioners and government officials.  These individuals, 
normally focused on narrow parts of specific fields, may then be 
affected by the overarching reputation and believe that the 
overarching reputation represents a state better than their in-
dividual perceptions based on a limited level of interaction.211   
Another possible explanation for the reputational difference 
between the United States and Canada is the radically different 
levels of interaction they have with other states.  A different 
relative presence on the world stage is likely to produce differ-
ent reputations.  It is clear that most states interact with Can-
ada far less frequently  than with the United States.  As noted 
earlier, Canada’s economy is less diversified and smaller than 
the United States’.212  Canada also trades almost exclusively 
with the United States.213  Therefore, only a small portion of 
Canada’s comparatively smaller volume of trade impacts other 
states.  As a result, Canadian policies, trade, and governmental 
actions have less opportunity to upset other states.  In contrast, 
the much larger U.S. economy trades a relatively small portion 
of its economy, roughly 22%, with Canada.214  This leaves a con-
siderable amount of U.S. trade for the rest of the world, thus 
providing significantly greater opportunity for conflict.   
An economic data analysis supports the conclusion that in-
creased contacts with other states may influence reputation.  In 
2000, Canadian exports and imports from non-U.S. economies 
accounted for just under $107 billion.215  The United States, in 
contrast, exported and imported $1,589 billion from non-
  
 210. But see, Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 101–04 (arguing that reputa-
tion will be field-specific, and arguing against the “unitary” reputation theo-
rists). 
 211. Perhaps more troubling than the infection of trade specialists with the 
overarching reputation, despite their perceptions to the contrary, is the corre-
sponding inference that the generation of the overarching reputation may 
occur despite the respective trade activities of the United States and Canada.  
In other words, there is very little that could be done by each of these states 
within international trade to alter their reputations. 
 212. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 121–22, 222–23.  See infra, Part 
III.B.1.  
 213. See THE ECONOMIST, supra note 32, at 122 (85% of Canada’s trade is 
with the United States).   
 214. Id. at 223. 
 215. Id. at 121. 
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Canadian economies.216  In other words, the United States has 
roughly fifteen times as much trade interaction with other 
states as Canada does, and, hence, roughly fifteen times as 
much opportunity to create a reputation with those states.  It is 
therefore reasonably predictable that states will think more 
about their impression of the United States, whereas they will 
have little or no experience with Canada upon which to make a 
reputational determination.  Furthermore, if one does not have 
experience with another state, it is difficult to form a negative 
view of that state.  In contrast, interacting with the United 
States is bound to cause both negative and positive experi-
ences—though the negative tends to be focused upon by indi-
viduals and the media.217 
As with reputational spill-over, interaction between states is, 
in significant part, out of the hands of the states themselves.  
Neither the United States nor Canada is able to easily change 
its level of interaction with other states.  Certainly, U.S. trade 
policy-makers will not be able to single-handedly change the 
global reputation of the United States that spills over into the 
trade field.  This impotence is a significant issue for the utility 
of reputation in international law.  
B. Reputational Fallacy:  Problems and Solutions 
The impact of state reputation can be significant, hence, 
reputation needs to be accurate and reflect the real behavior of 
states.  Reputations will often be out of the control of the states 
themselves, therefore an international effort to correct or com-
pensate for reputational fallacies is vital to the health of the 
international legal system.218  Accordingly, states’ reputations 
must be thoroughly examined.  Discovery of inaccurate reputa-
tion must be exposed.  Such exposure will produce tangible 
benefits for the individual states themselves and for the inter-
national law system as a whole.219 
  
 216. Id. at 223. 
 217. See e.g., Beverly Orndorff, Automatic Viligance System: Thoughts Tend  
to the Negative, RICH. TIMES–DISPATCH, Oct. 18, 1992, at A13; Maksim I. 
Shapir, The Aesthetic Experience of the Twentieth Century: The Avant-Garde 
and Postmodernism, 2 PHILILOGICA 137, 140 (1995), available at 
http://www.rvb.ru/philologica/02eng/02eng_postmodernism.htm.  
 218. See infra Part I, IV.B.2. 
 219. See infra Part IV.B.1.–B.2. 
File: Picker Macro 122704.doc Created on: 12/27/2004 1:25 PM Last Printed: 12/27/2004 1:26 PM 
2004] REPUTATIONAL FALLACIES  111 
1. Exposure of the Fallacy and the Individual States 
Correcting a reputational falsehood can have immediate im-
pact upon states that act similarly but have different reputa-
tions, such as the United States and Canada.  Exposure of the 
falsehood may, as an initial matter, serve to publicize the prob-
lem and therefore bring it to the attention of trade specialists, 
some of whom will hopefully be instrumental in the develop-
ment of the world trading regime.  Specialists may also find 
discussion of reputational fallacies helpful in understanding 
attitudes toward states during multilateral proceedings.  Dis-
cussion of reputational fallacies may also serve broader goals 
than simply informing experienced negotiators.  It may also 
provide specific benefits to the individual states that have lived 
under a false reputation—states that often believed the reputa-
tion to be accurate, even as to themselves.  Thus, for example, 
exposure of the reputational fallacies associated with the 
United States and Canada may bring specific therapeutic and 
instrumental benefits to each country. 
Discussion of reputational fallacies may prove to be of thera-
peutic benefit to Americans.  Many Americans traveling over-
seas are embarrassed by perceptions of U.S. behavior—
perceptions often shared by Americans themselves.220  This per-
ception is evinced by Americans who masquerade as Canadians 
while traveling in Europe by sporting a Canadian flag on their 
backpacks!221  While such a scenario is not a serious issue, it re-
flects the worldview of Americans when placed in international 
settings that may include more serious venues than the banter 
in a youth hostel lounge, including venues such as multilateral 
  
 220. See, e.g., Allan M. Winkler, World Is Wondering What We’re Doing, 
CINCINNATI POST, June 11, 2004, at A11; John Hind, What’s the Word?: Pre-
tendanians: Americans Posing as Canadians, OBSERVER MAG., Mar. 17, 2003, 
at 12 (“the trend is toward American travelers declaring themselves Cana-
dian”). 
 221. See, e.g., Alice Thomas, Water Bottles A Sure Sign of Yanks Abroad, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Aug. 12, 2004, at B8 (“feeling like moving targets, 
Americans abroad have adopted their own kind of camouflage…[some] have 
been known to attach Canadian flags to their backpacks”); Nicholas Stein, 
Newsmen and Con Men: That Trustworthy Canadian Accent Works Very Well 
With American TV Audiences. But Trustworthiness Has an Evil Twin…, 
FORTUNE, Feb. 23, 2004, at 56 (“when American teenagers travel abroad, 
many affix a Canadian flag to their backpacks — the maple leaf often gets a 
warmer reception than the Stars and Stripes.”). 
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negotiations and other international law activities vital for the 
interests of the United States.  As the comparative analysis of 
U.S. and Canadian reputation suggests, the United States is, in 
many ways, just another state, albeit one with greater presence 
and muscle.  Accordingly, at least with respect to international 
trade, there is no reason for an American to hide behind a Ca-
nadian flag.222  Therapeutically, it would do Americans good to 
know that the United States is just another state.   
Canada could also benefit therapeutically from the discussion 
of reputational fallacies.  Canada’s national self-image, Anglo-
Canada’s at least, at times has been defined in terms of being 
unlike the United States.223  Even if this is true only in small 
measure, understanding reputational fallacies associated with 
Canada and the United States may help purge this element of 
the Canadian national character.  Perhaps the realization that 
Canada and the United States are similar in their external re-
lations will free Canada from comparing itself with the United 
States when considering its own identity.  Canada is suffi-
ciently unique that it need not compare itself to the United 
States in order to fully realize its own identity.  Canada’s real 
identity does not lie within the fallacies propagated on the for-
eign stage, but, rather, on its own unique history and culture. 
In addition to providing therapeutic benefits to both Canada 
and the United States, exposing their reputational fallacies 
should also produce tangible bilateral and multilateral benefits 
in the world trading system. Purging their reputational falla-
cies should impact the United States–Canada relationship, 
placing it on a more accurate footing.  Increased understanding 
of the actual attributes of each nation would contribute to the 
  
 222. Ironically, in matters of trade law, if not in other areas as well, the 
masquerade is likely to be successful given the remarkable level of similarity 
between the two states. 
 223. See, e.g., John Sullivan, The Lessons of Madrid: Canadians Are in Mass 
Denial About Terrorism, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, March 21, 2004, at B6 (sug-
gesting humorously, but nevertheless exposing something of Canadian’s na-
tional self-image, that “[t]he United States’ contributions to world culture are 
bourbon and the 12-bar blues; ours is anti-Americanism.”).  Atkey, supra note 
156, at 179.  This is not to suggest that Canadians are averse to engaging in 
scathing self criticism, see, e.g., Murray Dobbin, Canada Is a World-Class 
Trade Bully, NAT’L POST, Nov. 12, 2001, available at 2001 WL 29559593.  
Though, given their world reputation, they may be the only real critics of their 
own policies.  
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development of this important bilateral relationship, as well as 
provide a better basis for joint involvement at the multilateral 
stage.       
A truer understanding of each state’s behaviors and actions 
may serve to “normalize” the relationship between the United 
States and Canada.  Canadians should benefit from a more bal-
anced view of U.S. trade policy when they realize the substan-
tial similarity of the two states in this field.  Similarly, showing 
the United States that Canada has similar trade behaviors and 
is not a characterless “goody two-shoes” should help the United 
States appreciate Canada for its strength and independence on 
the world stage.  Hopefully, this will encourage the United 
States not to take for granted its special relationship with Can-
ada.  Given the substantial integration of the two states eco-
nomically, socially, and geographically, such normalization is 
long overdue. 224 
The multilateral trading system will also benefit from de-
bunking U.S. and Canadian reputational fallacies.  Canada will 
profit by being regarded in a truer light during negotiations.  
The United States will benefit from international recognition 
that it is not so different from the more favorably-viewed Can-
ada.  Clarification that Canadian behavior is substantially simi-
lar to that of the United States should result in a realization by 
other international actors that the United States is just like 
everybody else—though spotlighted more often than other na-
tions—and, hence, should receive equal treatment regarding its 
trade actions.  Increased honesty in assessment of states should 
allow increasingly transparent and honest negotiations, thus, 
allowing states and their negotiators to more accurately re-
spond to specific proposals, rather than the reputation of the 
state advancing the proposal.  This should serve to place Can-
ada, the United States, and other states on a more level footing 
during negotiations and international interactions.   
  
 224. See, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 68 (a trade agreement that affects both 
the U.S. and Canadian economies).  Remember the recent electrical blackouts 
throughout the Northeast of the continent were transnational.  See CNN.com, 
Power Returns to Most Areas Hit by Blackout, Aug. 15, 2003 (the blackout 
affected areas from Michigan to New York in the United States, and as far 
north as Toronto, Canada), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
US/08/15/power.outage/. 
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2. Exposure of the Fallacy and the International Legal System 
In addition to helping states directly impacted by an inaccu-
rate reputation, exposure of reputational fallacies will also posi-
tively impact the international legal system.  As an initial mat-
ter, employment of inaccurate reputation disrupts the utility of 
reputation as an enforcement mechanism.225  After all, it is diffi-
cult to shame a perceived rule-breaking state into compliance 
when that state’s reputation of being a rule-breaker is inaccu-
rate.  Furthermore, it is questionable what a state can do to 
change its behavior, and hence its reputation, if it is already in 
compliance with relevant areas of international law.   Addition-
ally, as was shown in the trade context, a state may have little 
ability to change its reputation in a specific field.  Thus, while 
the United States may make behavioral changes and modify 
some rules out of shame or fear of sullying its reputation, its 
reputation is unlikely to change.226  This scenario exemplifies 
why it is crucial to ensure that reputation be accurate. 
The consequences of these scenarios—that a state is the vic-
tim of inaccurate reputation and that other states can behave 
the same and be viewed more positively—may undermine re-
spect for the international system and/or encourage unlawful 
activity by states.  After all, a state may believe that compliance 
with international law is not beneficial if it will continue to be 
regarded as disreputable when compared with other similarly 
situated states, regardless of its actual behavior.  Similarly, the 
legitimacy of the international legal system becomes question-
able when states that behave similarly are not subject to the 
same sanctions—in this case, the sanction of a bad reputation 
and all the accompanying negative consequences. 
In addition, inefficiencies will be introduced into the system.  
For example, if the world’s view of America’s employment of 
domestic trade mechanisms, such as antidumping actions, was 
inaccurate, then antidumping provisions of the WTO or the on-
going negotiations on dumping actions during the present nego-
tiating round may consequently be unnecessary, inefficient, or 
out of touch with reality.  This may not be the case, however, it 
  
 225. Downs & Jones, supra note 7, at 99–101.  
 226. Even if some modification of U.S. reputation resulted from behavioral 
changes, the United States is still likely to suffer a relatively worse reputation 
than states which exhibit substantially similar behavior.   
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provides an effective example of how reputational fallacies can 
impact the larger international legal system.  Accordingly, ex-
posure of reputational fallacies and recognition of the potential 
distortions and consequences for the international legal system 
are necessary to protect the system from illegitimacy, inefficien-
cies, and unjust results for specific states.    
V. CONCLUSION 
Reputation can play a useful role in international law.  
Among other things, it can inform other states of a state’s be-
havioral propensities.  Reputation may also serve to encourage 
state compliance with international law, as states attempt to 
shake off the effects of a negative reputation.  However, as 
shown in the context of the international trade reputations of 
the United States and Canada, state reputations share much in 
common with individual reputation and village gossip—they 
can represent unsupported assumptions and reflect views de-
rived from unrelated fields and activities.  While it would not be 
proper to extrapolate the findings in this Article to states’ repu-
tations in all fields, nonetheless it concludes that concern re-
garding reputations and their accuracy is merited.  Reputa-
tional fallacy is especially problematic considering the impact 
that reputation can have on interstate interactions — from 
international dispute adjudication to negotiations.  
Additionally, fallacies can have a negative impact within a state 
and contribute to an invalid self-image.  They may also 
contribute to strained relations between neighboring states, as 
with the United States and Canada.  Accordingly, it is 
important to establish the accuracy of reputations, or work to 
make them more accurate through increased transparency and 
information dissemination. 
Understanding that reputational inaccuracies are common-
place is the first step in exposing reputational fallacies.  Due to 
the normative foundations of reputation determinations, it may 
not be possible, or desirable, to establish whether a state is a 
good or bad actor.  Therefore, at a minimum, accurate state 
reputations can and should be established comparatively.  
Thus, examination of different states’ actions in international 
law fields will elucidate whether states should have different 
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reputations based on different behaviors.227  Purging reputa-
tional fallacies from international law is entirely possible.  Re-
moval of reputational fallacies in the international system 
would mean that states with similar behaviors would have 
comparable reputations in each field.  Additionally, field-
specific reputation would not be impacted by reputations from 
other unrelated fields or by a state’s level of interaction with 
other states.  Achieving this goal will go a long way towards 
minimizing the negative impacts of fallacious reputations on  
states and the international legal system. 
 
  
 227. Indeed, such empirical research into reputation has occurred in the 
field of transnational corruption and bribery, where reputation is established 
through surveys of those directly involved in the transactions at issue.  See 
TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX 2003, at 
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2003/cpi2003.en.html.  Published annually, 
Transparency International’s research is invariably surprising in its ability to 
show that the incidence of bribery among countries is not always what one 
would expect.  Id. A perfect example is the relative position of the United 
States and Chile (positions: 18th and 20th least corrupt, respectively), or Italy 
and Kuwait (tied at 35th least corrupt) or that Hong Kong is considered less 
corrupt than the United States.  Id. 
